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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report presents the main findings of a study on “The Development of US Policies directed at 
stimulating Innovation and Entrepreneurship” conducted by Audretsch Economic Research. This 
study was commissioned by the Institute of Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) of the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Center, as part of its line of research on Rethinking 
Innovation and Industrial policies in the EU&US: ICT and high-tech industries and the EU-US 
productivity, innovation and R&D gaps.1 The study final report was prepared by David B. Audretsch2 
and Taylor Aldridge. 
This report explores how US federal institutions fund and influence innovation in the knowledge 
economy context and if particular innovation policies could be replicated in other countries. Three 
key US agencies are identified as having significantly contributed to innovation and growth: (1) the 
Small Business Innovative Research program (SBIR), (2) the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) 
and (3) the Defense Advanced Research Program Agency (DARPA). How these agencies have 
advanced US innovation is explained in detail.  
Parts A and B of the report describe US innovation policies and instruments and discuss the 
rationale for policies directed at stimulating innovation and entrepreneurship. The report 
demonstrates the important role of public policies, including public-private partnerships and non-
profit organizations, in enhancing entrepreneurship. These public policies reduce or at least 
compensate for market failures in the process of commercialization of ideas and conversion of 
inventions into commercial innovations. The authors argue that by encouraging university scientists 
and other knowledge workers to commercialize their products through starting new firms and 
facilitating this process, innovation policy can effectively generate spillovers and the 
commercialization of knowledge. 
The impact of public policy on innovation extends beyond the firms. Indeed, there are indications 
that public policy can influence the cognitive process by which university scientists and other 
knowledge workers reach the decision to commercialize their research by starting a new firm and 
entering into entrepreneurship. This would suggest that public policies such at the ATP and the SBIR 
make an important contribution to enhancing and augmenting entrepreneurship. These policies can 
and do influence the career trajectories of university scientists by facilitating their decision to start 
companies and become entrepreneurs in order to commercialize their research and ideas.  
The ATP awards help bridge a funding gap left by venture capitalists and foster knowledge 
spillovers, leading ATP-funded projects to produce not only firm-specific benefits but broad national 
economic benefit as well.  DARPA was created as an institutional response to the space race with 
the Soviet Union in 1958. Over the past fifty years, the agency is widely regarded as having enabled 
development of computer networking, and many other technologies.  
The main example of innovation policy in the United States discussed in this report is the SBIR. The 
reason for this focus is because Horizon 2020, the new European program for research and 
innovation that will start in 2014 and run for seven years, includes a new SME instrument, building 
on the SBIR model. The SBIR was created to provide early stage funding and enable firms to cross 
what has become known as the “Valley of Death”, or the financing constraints typically confronting 
new and young firms, especially in knowledge-based and high-technology industries.  
In Phase I of the SBIR, SMEs receive funding to explore the feasibility and commercial potential of a 
new idea (proof of concept). In Phase II, R&D is supported with a particular focus on demonstration 
activities (testing, prototype, scale-up studies, design, piloting innovative processes, products and 
services, performance verification etc.) and market replication.  
                                                 
1  For more details on this research project, see:  http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/innovation.html   
2  David Audretsch is a Distinguished Professor, the Ameritech Chair of Economic Development, and Director 
of the Institute for Development Strategies at Indiana University. 
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Phase III of the SBIR is about commercialization though it does not provide direct funding.  The 
agencies which contribute to SBIR funding do not usually offer funding for Phase III awards. The 
exceptions are NASA and the Department of Defense which may selectively offer small Phase III 
awards.  The primary purpose of Phase III is simply to serve as a signal that the SBIR awardee has 
successfully completed Phases I and II and is therefore potentially ready for private sector funding.  
The report examines the implementation of SBIR policies and also their possible adoption in other 
countries. The report discusses in some detail the often-misunderstood role of government 
procurement under SBIR.  The US federal procurement rules are very rigid and cost intensive; they 
impose on new firms high compliance costs which give incumbent firms an advantage when bidding 
for federal contracts.  
Just as efforts to obtain private finance can be hindered by burdensome regulations involved in 
government procurement in the United States, similar challenges may exist in government 
procurement in other countries as well.  A second problematic aspect for potential Phase III firms in 
other countries is venture capital regional specialization. Just as most venture capital for IT and 
Biotech can be found in Silicon Valley or Route 128 in the US, this same sort of specialization is also 
found in other countries. These regional differences may make it more difficult for Phase III firms to 
find the necessary funding for product production.   
To conclude, Part C of the report identifies US policies which could conceivably be replicated in other 
countries. Most notably, the authors argue that spurring innovation from European universities, with 
the help of an SBIR-like institution, may offer considerable help in transforming European ideas into 
innovations. The report concludes that the SBIR offered significant aid to innovative firms in the US 
and its replication by Horizon 2020 could also offer significant advantages for commercialization of 
inventions and ideas. However, the report points out several potential problems in a adopting an 
SBIR-like program in other countries, mainly related to Phase III and to procurement.  
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PART A: THE ROLE OF INNOVATION POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.1 Knowledge, Entrepreneurship and Innovation  
Industrial policy in the United States has played a key role in developing the innovative capacity and 
overall economic performance of the country. In particular, government policy has undertaken a 
number of key initiatives, such as the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR), the 
Advanced Technology Program (ATP), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
with the explicit mandate to enhance US competitive performance. These agencies not only help 
firms innovate where they otherwise would most likely not have innovated, but they also help to 
address the current and future needs of government agencies for innovative solutions. In order to 
understand how and why government intervention is needed, the report first offers an explanation 
of why R&D and innovation require government support. 
A.1.1 The role of knowledge, R&D and innovation  
In what Zvi Griliches (1979) formalized as the model of the knowledge production function, the firm 
is assumed to be exogenous. The strategies and investments of the firm are then modeled as 
choice variables generating innovative activity and are therefore modeled as being endogenous. 
Thus, the model of the firm knowledge production function starts with an exogenously given firm 
and examines which types of strategies and investments generate the greatest amount of 
innovative output. Griliches, in fact, suggested that it was investments in knowledge inputs that 
would generate the greatest yield in terms of innovative output. 
Griliches’ seminal article prompted a large number of studies which attempted to empirically test 
the knowledge production function. These studies were confronted with numerous 
measurement issues: innovative output had to be measured and knowledge inputs had to 
operationalized. While the economic concept of innovative activity does not lend itself to exact 
measurement (Griliches, 1990), scholars developed measures such as the number of patented 
inventions, new product introduction, share of sales accounted for by new products, productivity 
growth and export performance as proxies for innovative output. Developing measures that 
reflected investments in knowledge inputs by the firm proved equally challenging. Still, a plethora of 
studies (Cohen and Klepper, 1992; Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984), developed proxies of firm-
specific investments in new economic knowledge in the form of expenditures on R&D and 
human capital as key inputs that yield a high innovative output. 
Cohen and Levinthal's absorptive capacity argument 
The literature empirically testing the model of the knowledge production function generated a series 
of econometrically robust results which substantiated Griliches’ view that firm investments in 
knowledge inputs were required to produce innovative output. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) provided 
an even more compelling interpretation of the empirical link between firm-specific investments in 
knowledge and innovative output. According to Cohen and Levinthal, by developing the capacity to 
adapt new technology and ideas developed in other firms, firm-specific investments in knowledge 
such as R&D provided the capacity to absorb external knowledge. This key insight implied that by 
investing in R&D, firms could develop the absorptive capacity to appropriate at least some of the 
returns accruing to investments in new knowledge made externally to the firm. This insight only 
strengthened the conclusion that the empirical evidence linking firm-specific investments in new 
knowledge to innovative output verified the assumptions underlying the model of the knowledge 
production function. 
The individual entrepreneur 
Audretsch (1995) challenged the assumption underlying the knowledge production model of firm 
innovation by shifting the unit of analysis away from the firm to the individual. In this view, 
individuals such as scientists, engineers or other knowledge workers are assumed to be endowed 
with a certain stock of knowledge. They are then confronted with the choice of how best to 
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appropriate the economic return from that knowledge. Thus, just as the appropriability question 
identified by Cohen and Levin (1989) confronts the firm, an analogous appropriability question 
confronts the individual knowledge worker. 
The concept of the entrepreneurial decision resulting from the cognitive processes of opportunity 
recognition and ensuing action is introduced by Eckhardt and Shane (2003) and Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000). They suggest that an equilibrium view of entrepreneurship stems from the 
assumption of perfect information. By contrast, imperfect information generates divergences in 
perceived opportunities across different people. The sources of heterogeneity across individuals 
include different access to information, as well cognitive abilities, psychological differences, and 
access to financial and social capital. 
The geographical dimension  
Recognition of the role that firm-specific knowledge investments could play in accessing and 
absorbing external knowledge, and therefore enhancing the innovative output of the firm, triggered 
an explosion of studies which focused on potential sources of knowledge that are external to the 
firm. Some studies examined the role of licensing, cooperative agreements and strategic 
partnerships, all of which involve a formal agreement and a market transaction for the sale of 
knowledge. Thus, these all represent mechanisms by which a firm can access knowledge produced 
by another firm. As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) emphasized, presumably internal investments in 
knowledge are a prerequisite for absorbing such external knowledge even if it can be accessed. 
A different research trajectory focused on flows of knowledge across firms where no market 
transaction or formal agreement occurred, or what has become known as knowledge spillovers. The 
distinction between knowledge spillovers and technology transfer is that in the latter, a market 
transaction occurs, whereas in the case of spillovers, the benefits are accrued without an economic 
transaction. 
While Krugman (1991) and others certainly did not dispute the existence or importance of 
knowledge spillovers, they contested the claim that knowledge spillovers are geographically 
bounded. Their point was that when the marginal cost of transmitting information across 
geographic space approaches zero, there is no reason to think that the transmission of knowledge 
across geographic space will stop simply because it has reached the political border of a city, state 
or country. 
However, von Hippel (1994) explained how knowledge is distinct from information and requires 
geographic proximity in transmitting ideas that are highly dependent upon their context, inherently 
tacit and have a high degree of uncertainty. This followed from Arrow (1962), who distinguished 
economic knowledge from other economic factors as being inherently non-rival in nature so that 
knowledge developed for any particular application can easily spill over to generate economic value 
in very different applications. As Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992, p. 1126) have 
observed, “Intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and 
continents.” 
Thus, a distinct research trajectory developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s which tried to 
identify the impact of location on the innovative output of firms. These studies addressed the 
question “Holding firm-specific knowledge inputs constant, is the innovative output greater if the 
firm is located in a region with high investments in knowledge?” The answer to this question was 
provided in a series of studies which shifted the unit of observation for testing the model of the 
knowledge production function from the firm to a spatial unit of observation, such as a city, region 
or state. 
A.1.2 The knowledge filter 
Because of the conditions inherent in radical innovation based on knowledge ― high uncertainty, 
asymmetries and transactions cost ― decision-making hierarchies can decide not to commercialize 
new ideas that individual economic agents, or groups of economic agents, think are potentially 
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valuable and should be pursued. The characteristics of knowledge that distinguish it from 
information―a high degree of uncertainty combined with non-trivial asymmetries, combined with a 
broad spectrum of institutions, rules and regulations―distinguish radical innovation from 
incremental innovation. Thus, not all potential innovative activity, especially radical innovations 
created through scientific discoveries and inventions, is fully appropriated within the firm which 
made the investments to create that knowledge in the first place. 
The ability of decision makers to reach a consensus tends to be greater when it is based on more 
information and less knowledge. A decision's outcomes and their associated probability distributions 
are more certain when the decision is based on information and, by definition, less certain when it is 
based on knowledge. Radical innovation typically involves more knowledge and less information 
than does incremental innovation.  
Various constraints on the ability of a large firm to determine the value of knowledge prevent it 
from fully exploiting the inherent value of its knowledge assets (Moran and Ghoshal, 1999). In fact, 
evidence suggests that many large, established companies find it difficult to take advantage of all 
the opportunities emanating from their investment in scientific knowledge (Christensen and 
Overdorf, 2000). For example, Xerox’s Palo Alto research center succeeded in generating a large 
number of scientific breakthroughs (a superior personal computer, the facsimile machine, the 
Ethernet and the laser printer, among others), yet failed to commercialize many of them and 
develop them into innovations (Smith and Alexander, 1988; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002).  
The knowledge conditions inherent in radical innovation impose what Audretsch et al. (2006) and 
Acs et al. (2005) term the knowledge filter (see Figure 1). The knowledge filter is the gap between 
knowledge that has potential commercial value and knowledge that is actually commercialized in 
the form of innovative activity. The greater the knowledge filter, the more pronounced the gap 
between new knowledge and commercialized knowledge in the form of innovative activity. An 
example of the knowledge filter which confronts a large firm is provided by the response of IBM to 
Bill Gates, who approached IBM to see if it was interested in purchasing the then struggling 
Microsoft. They weren’t interested. IBM turned down “the chance to buy 10% of Microsoft for a song 
in 1986, a missed opportunity that would cost $3 billion today.”3 IBM reached its decision on the 
grounds that “neither Gates nor any of his band of thirty some employees had anything 
approaching the credentials or personal characteristics required to work at IBM.”
4
 
                                                 
3  “System Error,” The Economist, 18 September 1993, p. 99. 
4  Ibid. 
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Figure 1: The Knowledge Filter 
 
Thus, the knowledge filter serves as a barrier impeding investments in new knowledge from being 
pursued and developed to generate innovative activity. In some cases, a firm will decide against 
developing and commercializing new ideas emanating from its knowledge investments even if an 
employee or group of employees think they have a positive expected value. As explained above, this 
divergence arises because of the inherent conditions of uncertainty, asymmetries and high 
transactions costs which create the knowledge filter. While Griliches’ model of the knowledge 
production function focuses on the decision-making context of the firm concerning investments in 
new knowledge, Audretsch (1995) proposed shifting the unit of analysis from the firm to the 
individual knowledge worker (or group of knowledge workers). This shifted the fundamental 
decision-making unit of observation in the model of the knowledge production function away from 
exogenously assumed firms to individuals such as scientists, engineers or other knowledge 
workers―agents with endowments of new economic knowledge. Shifting the focus away from the 
firm to the individual as the relevant unit of observation also shifts the appropriation problem to 
the individual so that the relevant question becomes how economic agents with a given endowment 
of new knowledge can best appropriate the returns from that knowledge. If an employee can pursue 
a new idea within the context of the organizational structure of the incumbent firm, there is no 
reason to leave the firm. If, on the other hand, employees place greater value on their ideas than 
the decision-making hierarchy of the incumbent firm, they may face forgoing what has been 
determined to be a good idea. Such divergences in the valuation of new ideas force workers to 
choose between forgoing ideas and starting a new firm to appropriate the value of their knowledge. 
Because radical innovative activity is based more on decisions involving knowledge and less on 
decisions involving information, it is accordingly more vulnerable to being impeded by the 
knowledge filter. By contrast, incremental innovation is based more on decisions involving 
information than knowledge, and therefore is less vulnerable to being impeded by the knowledge 
filter. 
By focusing on the decision-making context which confronts the individual knowledge worker, the 
knowledge production function is actually reversed. Knowledge becomes exogenous and embodied 
in a worker. The firm is created endogenously in the workers’ efforts to appropriate the value of 
their knowledge through innovative activity. Typically, an employee in an incumbent large 
corporation, often a scientist or engineer working in a research laboratory, will have an idea for an 
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invention and ultimately for an innovation. Accompanying this potential innovation is an expected 
net return from the new product. The inventor would expect compensation for the potential 
innovation accordingly. If the company has a different, presumably lower, valuation of the potential 
innovation, it may decide either not to pursue its development or that it merits a lower level of 
compensation than that expected by the employee. In either case, employees will weigh the 
alternative of starting their own firm. If the gap in the expected return accruing from the potential 
innovation between the inventor and the corporate decision maker is sufficiently large, and if the 
cost of starting a new firm is sufficiently low, the employee may decide to leave the large 
corporation and establish a new enterprise.  
The knowledge filter approach has important consequences concerning the role of policies. 
While in the classical knowledge production function approach, public policies are supposed to 
correct for failures in the market for the financing of innovation and for the posit ive 
externalities arising from the public good nature of R&D activities (which add to the stock of 
existing knowledge), according to the knowledge filter approach public policies should also try 
to correct for the market failure associated with entrepreneurship (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: The Public Policy/Individual Entrepreneur/Regional Environmental Nexus 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Feldman et al. 2001 
 
Such market failures might result in low levels of regional entrepreneurship capital that pre-
empt scientists and other knowledge workers who perceive and recognize an entrepreneurial 
opportunity from actually pursuing that opportunity by starting a new firm and entering 
into entrepreneurship (not all regions, as a result of historical,  institutional, and other 
reasons are endowed with the same amount of entrepreneurship capital). Thus, public policies 
such as ATP and SBIR, but also regional and local policies, including science and technology 
parks and incubators, can serve to augment and enhance regional entrepreneurship capital, allowing 
companies, which require additional assets of capital, knowledge workers or other missing 
ingredients, to develop their ideas into successful market innovations (more on this in Section A 
1.5). 
Summarizing, when considering the different approaches we have to recognize that each separate 
strand of literature focusing on technological innovation makes a distinct contribution to 
understanding the determinants of firm innovation. In particular, these different approaches to 
innovation suggest that four key units of observation are crucial in understanding the innovation 
process – the firm, the region, the individual and the institutional/public policy context. 
New-firm start-ups are important to innovation, because they embody a mechanism which 
facilitates the spillover of knowledge produced with one intended application in an incumbent 
corporation or university laboratory, but which is actually commercialized by a new and different 
firm.  
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The individual matters to innovation because the individual scientists or engineers are confronted 
with a career trajectory decision – should they remain in a university laboratory or incumbent 
corporation, or should they start a new high technology enterprise? If no individual scientist or 
engineer makes the decision to start a new high technology firm, there will be fewer knowledge 
spillovers and therefore less innovative activity. 
Geography matters because the region provides the spatial platform in which knowledge spillovers 
are generated, absorbed and ultimately commercially exploited and appropriated. The decision to 
start a new high technology enterprise is shaped by the presence of knowledge, and financial and 
other complementary assets that are available in the region. 
A.1.3  Measuring and identifying innovative firms 
In order for an innovation agency to properly identify and award support to potential firms, a 
method of identifying innovation will be required. The section offers several different methods and 
concepts for identifying firms with potential market innovations. 
Surveys and expert panels  
One useful measurement technique for identifying innovations is the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS). This survey is important in the EU context. Seven surveys were completed throughout Europe 
to understand how innovative specific fields were within the European context. These surveys are 
used by policy makers and experts to address needed improvements in innovative fields of 
technology. 
There is also a long tradition of relying on industry experts to identify innovative activity. The first 
serious attempt to directly measure innovative output was by a panel of industry experts 
assembled by Gellman Research Associates (1976) for the National Science Foundation. The 
Gellman panel of international experts compiled a database of 500 major innovations that were 
introduced into the market between 1953 and 1973 in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Japan, West Germany, France, and Canada. These innovations represented the "most significant new 
industrial products and processes, in terms of their technological importance and economic and 
social impact" (National Science Board, 1975, p. 100). 
A second and comparable database again involved an expert panel assembled by Gellman Research 
Associates (1982), this time for the US Small Business Administration. In this second study, Gellman 
compiled a total of 635 US innovations, including 45 from the earlier study for the National Science 
Foundation. The additional 590 innovations were selected from fourteen industry trade journals for 
the period 1970-1979. About 43% of the sample was selected from the award winning innovations 
described in the Industrial Research & Development magazine. 
The third data source that has attempted to directly measure innovation activity was compiled at 
the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom.5  The 
SPRU data consist of a survey of 4,378 innovations that were identified over a period of fifteen 
years. The survey was compiled by writing to experts in each industry and asking them to identify 
"significant technical innovations that had been successfully commercialized in the United Kingdom 
since 1945, and to name the firm responsible" (Pavitt et al., 1987, p. 299). 
Another study completed by Acs and Audretsch used 4,938 innovations and an expert panel to 
apply four levels of significance (see Table 1): (1) innovation establishes an entirely new category of 
product; (2) innovation is the first of its type on the market for a product category already in 
existence; (3) the innovation represents a significant improvement in technology; and (4) the 
innovation is a modest improvement designed to update an existing product (Acs and Audretsch 
1990). 
                                                 
5  The SPRU innovation data are explained in considerable detail in Pavitt et al. (1987), Townsend et al. 
(1981), Robson and Townsend (1984), and Rothwell (1989). 
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Table 1: Distribution of Large and Small-form Innovations According to Significance 
Levels (percentages in parentheses) 
 
Innovation 
significance 
Description Number of Innovations 
  Large Firms  Small Firms 
1 Establishes whole new 
categories 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
2 First of its type on the 
market in existing 
categories 
50 (1.76)  30 (1.43) 
3 A significant 
improvement in 
existing technology 
360 (12.70)  216 (10.27) 
4 Modest improvement 
designed to update 
existing products 
2,434 (85.53)  1,959 (88.31) 
       
Total  2,834 (99.99)  2,104 (100) 
Source: Adapted from Acs and Audretsch (1990). 
 
Acs and Audretsch found that none of the innovations were at the highest significance level. 
However, they did find that small firms produced made up a considerable portion of the innovations 
within the field. There appeared to be little difference in the “quality” and significance of 
innovations between large and small firms.  
The ex-post approach of relying upon industry experts to distinguish between more and less  
significant innovations -  that is, between radical and incremental innovations - has the advantage 
of being able to identify the extent to which a novel technological process is at the heart of the 
innovative process (Dewar and Dutton, 1986). This approach is consistent with the view posited by 
Dutton and Thomas (1985) that technology is best defined in terms of the knowledge content. 
Codified innovation: patents 
In the past twenty years, patents have become one of the most common means of measuring the 
degree to which an innovation is incremental or radical. Patents have become an important metric 
in the innovation literature because of the easy and open paper trail provided by patent citations. 
This trail clearly defines the origin of ideas and represents a clear trajectory of where ideas go 
when they are cited in the future. This trajectory comes in two forms: forward citations and 
backward citations. The patent citations also attribute a clear economic value to startups and 
economic growth (Trajtenberg, 1990). 
Forward patent citation radicalness 
Forward patent citation involves future citations of a patent. These citations come from United 
States Patent Examiners.6 Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) measure the degree of radicalness of 
forward patent citations by examining the computer disk industry and investigate the impact 
patents have on future citations in different domains of patent classification. Patent domains are 
                                                 
6  These professionals cite the previous patent only when there is a legitimate reason to cite the previous 
patent’s intellectual property. 
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maintained and categorized by the United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO). The authors’ 
show how incremental patents are often more narrowly cited within a certain domain of patents, 
and radical patents are often cited by multiple domains of patents, i.e., outside of their original 
domain. 
The forward patent count that Rosenknopf and Nerkar (2001) use is, in many ways, comparable to 
forward citations in scholarly journals. There are, however, two detrimental differences when using 
citations. First, it is in the interests of patent inventors to cite as little as possible from previous 
work. The less previous work is cited in the patent application, the more IP monopoly is granted to 
the inventor. Second, a patent examiner is required to assign relevant patent citations to the patent 
application. For a greater understanding of deficiencies in the US patent examining process see 
Graham and Harhoff (2006) and Graham et al. (2002). Drawing on patent citations creates other 
problems as well. As Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001, p.290) define radical innovation: “‘radical’ 
exploration builds upon distant technology that resides outside of the firm. The technological sub-
unit utilizes knowledge from a different technological domain and does not obtain that knowledge 
from other sub-units within the firm.”  
The above definition of radicalness holds innovation exogenous to the human capital and tacit 
knowledge of the firm. As Klepper and Graddy (1990) show, however, new and radical innovations 
can also come from sub-units within the firm. The distant technology can often be found within the 
incumbent firm, though it may be unwilling to operationalize the potential radical innovation due to 
managerial disagreements. It may also be unwilling to commit resources to a new and uncertain 
venture. 
Backward Patent Classification and Citations 
Backward patent citations are citations given to prior work. These citations are issued by patent 
examiners where examiners cite previous patents and thereby give the citations a clear line of 
intellectual property rights. Shane (2001) shows, through a unique data set from MIT inventors 
involving 1,397 licensed MIT patents, that the more radical an invention is, the more likely it is to 
have been made by a small firm. Similarly, Acs and Audretsch (1990) find that small firms 
contribute a high share of innovations that could be classified as being more radical than 
incremental. These studies found that innovations emanating from small firms were more likely to 
be classified as radical than innovations from large firms. As Shane (2001, p.208) explains, radical 
innovations tend to originate from newly established firms (typically small firms), whereas existing 
(and typically larger) firms have the competitive advantage in generating incremental innovations: 
“First, radical technologies destroy the capabilities of existing firms because they draw on new 
technical skills. Since organizational capabilities are difficult and costly to create (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Hannan and Feeman, 1984), established firms are organized to exploit established 
technologies. Firms find it difficult to change their activities to exploit technologies based on 
different technical skills.” Shane (2001) finds that research shows that radical patent citations and 
a lack of patent classification are positive to startups for the MIT-based patents.  
A.1.4 Financing and firm size: how small firms survive in illiquid capital markets 
One of the most consistent and compelling findings to emerge from a rich body of literature is that 
potential entrepreneurs with innovative ideas are frequently unable to attract adequate resources—
financial, management, technical, and human capital—which impedes their ability to launch, sustain 
or grow a new venture (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). While this inability to attract resources has 
many names—financing constraints, liquidity constraints, or the infamous “Valley of Death” 
(Branscomb and Auerswald, 2002), all of them entail a high degree of uncertainty concerning the 
expected outcome valuation of a new idea, combined with asymmetries in information and 
knowledge. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out that, unlike most markets, the market for credit is exceptional in 
that the price of the good—the rate of interest—is not necessarily at a level that equilibrates the 
market. They attribute this to the fact that interest rates influence not only demand for capital but 
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also the risk inherent in different classes of borrowers. As the rate of interest rises, so does the risk 
of borrowing, leading suppliers of capital to rationally decide to limit the number and size of loans 
they make at any particular interest rate. The amount of information about an enterprise is 
generally not orthogonal to size. Rather, as Petersen and Rajan (1994, p. 3) observe, “small and 
young firms are most likely to face this kind of credit rationing. Most potential lenders have little 
information on the managerial capabilities or investment opportunities of such firms and are 
unlikely to be able to screen out poor credit risks or to have control over a borrower's investments.” 
If lenders are unable to identify the quality or risk associated with particular borrowers, credit 
rationing will occur and thereby create market failure (Burghof, 2000). This phenomenon is 
analogous to the lemons argument advanced by George Akerloff (1970), where the market is 
unable to properly estimate the value of the startup. This market failure leads entrepreneurs to 
bridge this “Valley of Death” in financing, team member employment and advisor placement by 
other means than the commercial market clearinghouse for ideas.  
The existence of asymmetric information prevents the suppliers of capital from engaging in price 
discrimination between riskier and less risky borrowers. But, as Diamond (1994) argues, the risk 
associated with any particular loan is also not neutral with respect to the duration of the 
relationship. This is because information about the underlying risk inherent in any particular 
customer is transmitted over time. With experience, a lender will condition the risk associated with 
any class of customers by characteristics associated with the individual customer.  
Since potential entrepreneurs are left with the problem of how to finance, hire team members and 
attract advisors for their entrepreneurial pursuits, other avenues of advancing their entrepreneurial 
interest must arise in the face of market failure. One potential answer may lie in their ability to 
create sufficient social capital with potential partners to overcome this market failure. If, for 
example, entrepreneurs are able to concentrate their efforts on interacting efficiently and quickly 
with a target group of investors, team members or advisors, they may build enough social capital 
with the target group to form sufficient synergies for entrepreneurial success. Whether such 
concentrated efforts actually happen remain open to question by policy makers and scholars due to 
the difficult nature of data collection. 
Large incumbent firms with a proven track record can finance capital expenditures from own 
internal resources, issuance of equity, or debt. By contrast, new entrepreneurial ventures have 
limited resources and are less able to issue equity. Since gathering information is costly, banks will 
expand their search for information until the expected marginal benefit of search equals zero. If the 
remaining information asymmetry induces a risk premium,7 firms with fewer signaling opportunities 
will have higher costs of capital. The degree of information asymmetry depends on borrower 
characteristics such as firm size, firm age and governance, or legal form (Lehmann and Neuberger, 
2001). Typically, new and small firms provide less information to outside financiers than do their 
larger counterparts. This reflects the fixed costs of information disclosure, or the absence of 
disclosure rules. 
In addition, lack of reputation constrains the borrowing capacity of new entrepreneurial firms 
(Martinelli 1997). As firms age, information asymmetries decrease, and firms may earn a positive 
reputation through a proven credit history. As a result, new entrepreneurial ventures are often 
associated with higher loan rates and less access to financial resources.  
                                                 
7  This compensation device has the drawback that rising loan rates aggravate moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. Thus the supply curve may bend backwards (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). However, better 
information increases the ability to raise loan rates, since the bank's loan offer curve is less likely to bend 
backwards. 
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It would be erroneous to suggest that venture capital finances most of the early stage ventures in 
the United States. In fact, as Table 2 makes clear, most of the venture capital in the United States is 
focused instead on expansion and later stage growth, rather than early stage ventures8.  
Table 2: US Venture capital investment, financing stage, industry, and number of 
companies: 1995-2008 (millions of current dollars)  
Source: Adapted from National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010 
NOTES: The Seed/startup stage includes proof of concept (seed), research, product development, or initial 
marketing. Early includes financing for activities such as initial expansion, commercial manufacturing, and 
marketing. Expansion includes major expansion of activities, or to prepare a company expecting to go public 
within 6–12 months. Later includes acquisition financing and management and leveraged buyout. Internet 
specific are companies whose business model is fundamentally dependent on the Internet, regardless of the 
company's primary industry category. Clean technology comprises companies that focus on alternative 
energy, pollution and recycling, power supplies and conservation.   
                                                 
8  A different source of funding for small business is provided by the Small Business Investment Companies 
(SBICs). The SBICs provide financing to small firms by making available equity capital, long-term loans and 
management assistance to qualifying small businesses. 
Financing 
stage/industry/number 
of companies 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
All financing stages 7,628 10,840 14,364 20,172 52,016 101,767 39,308 21,250 19,278 22,117 22,922 26,334 30,639 28,077 
Seed/startup 1,244 1,267 1,309 1,679 3,571 3,053 739 327 341 461 893 1,194 1,330 1,494 
Early 1,694 2,614 3,430 5,389 11,263 24,569 8,387 3,723 3,455 3,918 3,830 4,195 5,686 5,346 
Expansion 3,553 5,340 7,382 9,999 28,720 58,138 22,248 12,063 9,760 9,086 8,574 11,417 11,386 10,473 
Later 1,138 1,619 2,243 3,105 8,463 16,007 7,935 5,138 5,723 8,653 9,626 9,528 12,237 10,765 
All industries 7,628 10,840 14,364 20,172 52,016 101,767 39,308 21,250 19,278 22,117 22,922 26,334 30,639 28,077 
Biotechnology 768 1,156 1,385 1,520 2,029 4,057 3,400 3,183 3,553 4,145 3,924 4,504 5,247 4,410 
Business products and 
services 
177 377 409 691 2,791 4,560 1,031 450 579 396 396 552 709 477 
Computers and 
peripherals 
324 383 377 372 897 1,596 655 457 373 590 539 532 586 424 
Consumer products 
and services 
473 503 738 622 2,534 3,350 662 228 163 309 304 407 476 437 
Electronics/ 
Instrumentation 
125 193 260 227 282 773 381 314 236 351 438 722 563 574 
Financial services 194 329 362 781 2,202 4,180 1,380 338 410 520 918 462 558 526 
Healthcare services 448 664 869 926 1,368 1,352 499 368 222 363 407 381 295 192 
Industrial/energy 529 504 696 1,407 1,508 2,479 1,067 740 756 775 808 1,925 3,222 4,576 
Information 
technology services 
178 430 655 1,057 3,958 8,619 2,391 1,039 775 737 1,063 1,377 1,707 1,812 
Media and 
entertainment 
910 1,074 956 1,744 6,560 10,299 2,312 712 879 965 1,149 1,624 1,962 1,884 
Medical devices and 
equipment 
627 648 1,016 1,144 1,511 2,312 1,997 1,838 1,602 1,921 2,186 2,910 3,872 3,446 
Networking and 
equipment 
347 612 937 1,360 4,259 11,409 5,543 2,595 1,737 1,545 1,517 1,091 1,378 735 
Other 10 21 56 88 84 45 62 4 0 1 57 8 2 23 
Retailing/distribution 314 257 303 609 2,805 3,067 321 151 65 174 207 201 365 235 
Semiconductors 202 299 567 618 1,290 3,542 2,391 1,503 1,764 2,128 1,923 2,101 2,080 1,641 
Software 1,123 2,218 3,281 4,367 10,295 24,012 10,141 5,150 4,462 5,375 4,803 4,920 5,423 5,027 
Telecommunications 880 1,171 1,498 2,639 7,642 16,116 5,074 2,180 1,701 1,822 2,283 2,618 2,196 1,659 
Internet specific 505 1,562 2,359 4,457 23,331 42,233 9,848 3,577 2,388 2,875 3,336 4,336 5,176 4,871 
Clean technology 77 157 144 107 200 577 386 390 263 440 523 1,458 2,656 4,023 
Number of companies 1,539 2,076 2,537 2,979 4,404 6,335 3,786 2,634 2,461 2,625 2,708 3,089 3,301 3,262 
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An important and broadly accepted strand of literature suggests that small and new firms will be at 
a competitive disadvantage with respect to generating innovative activity in general and radical 
innovations in particular. According to Griliches’ (1979) model of the knowledge production function, 
innovative activity is the direct result of a firm making investments in knowledge inputs, such as 
R&D and human capital. Since larger firms generally invest significantly more in R&D than small 
and new firms, they would be expected to generate more innovative activity. Since radical 
innovation generates more value than incremental innovation, some scholars have assumed, and 
even developed elaborate theoretical models to explain why, large firms, which have large R&D 
departments, will generate more radical innovations than small and new firms, which are 
constrained by size in their ability to invest in R&D (Cohen and Klepper, 1992a, b). 
Five factors favoring the innovative advantage of large enterprises have been identified in the 
literature. First is the argument that innovative activity requires a high fixed cost. As Comanor 
(1967) observes, R&D typically involves a “lumpy” process that yields scale economies. Similarly, 
Galbraith (1956, p. 87) argues, “Because development is costly, it follows that it can be carried on 
only by a firm that has the resources which are associated with considerable size.” Second, only 
firms that are large enough to attain at least temporary market power will choose innovation as a 
means for maximization (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975). This is because the ability of firms to 
appropriate the economic returns accruing from R&D and other knowledge-generating investments 
is directly related to the extent of that enterprise’s market power (Levin et al., 1985, 1987; Cohen et 
al., 1987; Cohen and Klepper, 1991). Third, R&D is a risky investment; small firms engaging in R&D 
make themselves vulnerable by investing a large proportion of their resources in a single project. 
However, their larger counterparts can reduce the risk accompanying innovation through 
diversification into simultaneous research projects. The larger firm is also more likely to find an 
economic application for the uncertain outcomes resulting from innovative activity (Nelson, 1959). 
Fourth, scale economies in production may also provide scope economies for R&D. Scherer (1991) 
notes that economies of scale in promotion and distribution facilitate penetration of new products, 
enabling larger firms to enjoy greater profit potential from innovation. Finally, an innovation yielding 
cost reductions of a given percentage results in higher profit margins for larger firms than for 
smaller firms. There is also substantial evidence that technological change, or rather one aspect of 
technological change – R&D, is, in fact, positively related to firm size. 
The empirical evidence from a plethora of studies suggests that, in terms of R&D inputs, large and 
more mature firms tend to make greater investments (i.e. R&D expenditures in absolute values) 
than do their smaller and younger counterparts. However, in terms of innovative outputs, the 
empirical evidence is very different. Younger and smaller enterprises contribute considerably more 
to innovative output than they do to R&D inputs, and therefore account for a greater share of 
innovative activity than they do for R&D investments (Acs and Audretsch, 2010). Moreover, as 
previously mentioned, newly established and small firms tend to generate more radical innovations, 
while established (and larger) firms focus more on incremental innovations. 
A.1.5 Role of public support programs in reducing market failures in financing of small 
(and young) companies 
The most predominant theory of innovation assumes that innovative opportunities are the result of 
systematic efforts by firms and the result of purposeful efforts to create knowledge and new ideas, 
and subsequently to appropriate the returns on those investments through their commercialization 
(Chandler, 1990; Cohen and Levin 1989; and Griliches 1979).  
In what Griliches formalized as the model of the knowledge production function, (exogenously 
existing) firms (endogenously) create innovative output through purposeful and dedicated 
investments in new knowledge (R&D and human capital for instance through training and 
education). In this framework, an important point for thinking about (and also analyzing and 
evaluating the impact of) public policy on innovation, is through focusing on the unit of observation 
of the firm. How does the firm change its activities, behavior, strategies and output as a result of 
policy intervention? For example, can policy tools, such as National Science Foundation funded 
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research, help existing firms in generating new sources of knowledge? Moreover, are there specific 
policy institutions, such as the STTR that can help facilitate these knowledge spillover overs? 
Certainly a minor army of scholars have put together a formidable body of literature which 
analyzes and evaluates the impact of various public policy instruments, including but not limited to 
the ATP and SBIR, on the innovative and economic performance of the firm (Branscomb & 
Auerswald, 2002; Feldman & Kelley, 2000 & 2001; Powell & Lellock, 2000; Silber & Associates, 
1996). 
A stark contrast to this focus on the firm is provided by the intellectual tradition in entrepreneurship 
literature, where the focus is on the cognitive decision-making process of the individual to start a 
new firm and enter into entrepreneurship. 
There is virtual consensus in the entrepreneurship literature that entrepreneurship revolves around 
the recognition of opportunities and the pursuit of those opportunities (Venkataraman, 1997). But 
the existence of those opportunities is, in fact, taken as given. The focus has been on the cognitive 
process by which individuals reach the decision to start a new firm. This has resulted in a 
methodology focusing on differences across individuals in analyzing the entrepreneurial decision 
(Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). Krueger (2003, p. 105) has pointed out that, “The heart of 
entrepreneurship is an orientation toward seeing opportunities,” which frames the research 
questions, “What is the nature of entrepreneurial thinking and what cognitive phenomena are 
associated with seeing and acting on opportunities?” 
Thus, the traditional approach to entrepreneurship essentially holds the opportunities constant and 
then asks how the cognitive process inherent in the entrepreneurial decision varies across different 
individual characteristics and attributes (Carter et. al., 2003; McClelland, 1961). Shane and Eckhardt 
(2003, p 187) summarize this literature in introducing the individual-opportunity nexus (see Figure 
2), “We discussed the process of opportunity discovery and explained why some actors are more 
likely to discover a given opportunity than others.” Some of these differences involve the willingness 
to incur risk, others involve the preference for autonomy and self-direction, while still others involve 
differential access to scarce and expensive resources, such as financial capital, human capital, 
social capital and experiential capital. 
The two approaches, the one focusing on existing firms and the other pointing to entrepreneurship, 
identify different sources for knowledge spillovers and market failures, and this generate different 
policy prescriptions. For instance, while Romer (1986), Lucas (1993) and others assumed that the 
spillover of knowledge would automatically serve as the engine for innovation and economic 
growth, Acs et al. (2005) and Audretsch et al. (2006) suggest that the “knowledge filter” may 
actually impede the spillover and commercialization of knowledge. To the degree that the 
knowledge filter impedes or constrains the spillover and commercialization of knowledge, 
entrepreneurship can serve as the missing link to economic growth by providing a conduit for the 
spillover of knowledge that might otherwise never have been commercialized (Audretsch et al., 
2006). This could explain why, for example, in the European Union we observe the simultaneous 
existence of high investments in new knowledge in the form of research and development (R&D), 
university research and high levels of human capital, combined with stagnant rates of economic 
growth and high levels of unemployment (so called “European Paradox”). In fact, empirical evidence 
suggests that regions endowed with higher levels of entrepreneurship capital also exhibit stronger 
economic performance, suggesting that new-firm startups serve as an important conduit of 
knowledge spillovers and commercialization. Thus, public policies such as ATP and SBIR, and also 
regional and local policies, including science and technology parks and incubators, can serve to 
augment and enhance regional entrepreneurship capital. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 3, 
government programs can assist firms in their technology creation and technological development 
of their ideas. This governmental assistance affords companies, which require additional assets of 
capital, knowledge workers or other missing ingredients, the opportunity to develop their ideas into 
successful market innovations. 
 18 
Figure 3: The Valley of Death 
 
Source: Adapted from Wessner, An Assessment of the SBIR Program, p.30 
Innovative performance in the United States has been shaped by public policy. Examples of public 
policy instruments which influence American innovative performance range from immigration laws 
and enforcement, to the R&D tax credit, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, and 
the Bayh-Dole Act. These instruments influence the ability of universities and university scientists to 
commercialize their research and ideas. 
Immigration policy influences the supply of human capital generally, and scientists and engineers in 
particular. The basic immigration policy in the United States was established by the Hart-Cellar Act.9 
High-skilled workers, including scientists and engineers are permitted to enter into the United 
States, and therefore become legally eligible for employment by high technology companies, 
through the H-1, L-1, O-1 and TN visa categories. Under the H-1B visa, which is the most common, 
the foreign scientist may retain legal residence for a period of three years which can be extended 
for up to six years. The L-1 visa applies to the intercompany transfer of international employees for 
employment in the United States by the same company. The O-1 visa is applicable for individuals 
with extraordinary ability. Immigrant visas, which are commonly referred to as the Green Card, are 
restricted to 145,000 annually. An E-2 visa enables an individual to enter and work inside the 
United States if he finances the startup of a new firm. An EB-5 visa applies to foreigners creating or 
preserving at least ten jobs for US workers.10 
Another important policy instrument, which facilitates innovation in the United States, is the R&D 
tax credit. In 1981, the US Congress passed a new law authorizing a tax credit for companies 
investing in R&D. The tax credit stipulated a 25% credit for R&D expenditures in excess of the 
average of a firm’s R&D expenditure in a base period (generally the previous three taxable years). 
The R&D tax credit has been renewed by Congress in subsequent years. Most OECD countries have 
also adopted the R&D tax credit. While there were 12 OECD countries providing an R&D tax credit in 
1996, by 2008, the number had grown to 21. Most states within the US also have R&D tax credits 
or a similar measure to promote R&D investments. 
While immigration policy and the R&D tax credit enhance investments in the innovative process, 
other instruments are designed to effectively penetrate the knowledge filter. In particular, the Bayh-
                                                 
9  See: http://library.uwb.edu/guides/usimmigration/79%20stat%20911.pdf 
10  See: 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/About%20Us/Electronic%20Reading%20Room/Customer%20Service%20Refer
ence%20Guide/Nonimmigrant_Empl.pdf  
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Dole Act was enacted to facilitate the commercialization of research that might otherwise remain 
dormant and undeveloped for innovative activity in the laboratories of universities. Prior to the 
Bayh-Dole Act, the bureaucratic impediments of interacting between potential innovators and the 
governmental agencies seem to reduce the commercialization of many scientific projects at 
universities. The Bayh-Dole Act effectively transferred the property rights of federally financed 
research and scientific projects from the funding government agency to the university. This made 
the university responsible for deciding how best to manage the process of commercializing 
scientific knowledge and transforming it into innovative activity, rather than the funding 
government agency. Thus, the contemporary policy in the United States is clearly oriented towards 
penetrating the knowledge filter impeding the spillover of ideas created at universities into 
innovative activity. 
A second example of innovation policy in the United States designed to facilitate penetration of the 
knowledge filter involves the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. As discussed in 
the previous sections, many nascent entrepreneurs and small firms are unable to procure sufficient 
funding to facilitate early stage finance of innovative ventures. The SBIR was created to provide 
such early stage funding and enable firms to cross what has become known as the “valley of 
death”, or the financing constraints which typically confront new and young firms, especially in 
knowledge-based and high technology industries. As a result of the introduction of the SBIR, and its 
subsequent effect on American innovative activity, a plethora of states, cities and regions, have 
implemented more local policies designed to enable small and young firms to develop proposals for 
SBIR funding. As the next section will make clear, the SBIR has had a strong and positive impact on 
the innovative performance of the United States11.  
A.2 The Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) 
In the United States, the 1970s were characterized by sluggish growth, persistent high rates of 
unemployment, and inadequate rates of job creation. In response to these economic problems, the 
US Congress enacted the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in 1982 explicitly to 
reinvigorate jobs and growth by enhancing the innovative capabilities of the United States. In 
particular, the explicit mandate assigned by the Congress was to (1) promote technological 
innovation; (2) enhance the commercialization of new ideas emanating from scientific research; (3) 
increase the role of small business in meeting the needs of federal research and development; and 
(4) expand the involvement of minority and disadvantaged people in innovative activity. 
The SBIR program functions through the 11 federal agencies12 which administer the program and 
award around $2.5 billion annually for innovative activity by small business. Qualifying small 
businesses are eligible to apply to the participating federal agencies of up to $150,000 for a Phase 
I award over a 6-month period. The Phase I objective for funding is to “establish technical merit, 
feasibility and commercial potential of the proposed R&D efforts to determine the quality of 
performance of the small business awardee organization”13 prior to Phase II funding. Phase II 
funding is dependent on Phase I funding. Only Phase I awardees may apply for Phase II funding. If 
the results of the Phase I awardee clearly show scientific and technical merit, the Phase II funding 
awards an amount of up to $1,000,000 over a two year period. Phase III funding is more of a 
business construct where the SBIR no longer funds business and the small businesses must find 
                                                 
11  In this report we only look at the US SBIR. However, we signal the existence of two European SBIR-like 
programs such as the SBRI program in the U.K. (see https://sbri.innovateuk.org/) and the SBIR program in 
the Netherlands (https://www.rvo.nl/subsidies-regelingen/aanbesteden-van-innovaties-sbir?wssl=1). 
12  The agencies consist of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), Department of Defense, 
Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department 
of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation. 
13  http://www.sbir.gov/faq/sbir#t25n66932 
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funding in the private sector or other non-SBIR federal agency funding. To commercialize their 
product, small businesses are expected to garner additional funds from private investors, the capital 
markets, or from the agency that made the initial award.14 In Figure 4, the entire timeline from 
Phase I to Phase III and the time allocated to each phase is shown. 
 
Figure 4: The SBIR timeline 
 
 
The impact of the SBIR program has been analyzed in considerable detail in a series of meticulous 
studies undertaken by the Board on Science, Technology and Economic Policy of the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, and also in a number of important studies 
by university scholars. There is compelling empirical evidence that the SBIR has generated a number 
of substantial benefits to the US economy. The country is no doubt more innovative and more 
competitive in the global economy and has generated more and better jobs as a result of the SBIR.  
The studies assessing the impact of the SBIR have generated robust findings. Studies with disparate 
methodologies including case studies of recipient SBIR firms, interviews with program 
administrators at the funding agencies, systematic analyses of broad based surveys of firms and 
sophisticated econometric studies based on objective measures comparing the performance of 
recipient SBIR firms with control groups consisting of matched pairs that did not receive any SBIR 
support, all point to the same thing – the SBIR has made a key and unequivocal contribution to the 
innovative performance of the United States, especially in terms of technological innovation. 
In particular, a number of key benefits emanating from the SBIR program can be identified from the 
literature. The key economic benefits accruing from implementation of the SBIR are most 
compelling in terms of two of the objectives stated in the Congressional mandate – the promotion 
of technological innovation and increased commercialization from investments in research and 
development. 
                                                 
14  National Research Council (US) Committee on Capitalizing on Science, Technology, and Innovation; 
Wessner CW, editor. SBIR and the Phase III Challenge of Commercialization: Report of a Symposium. 
Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2007. I, Introduction: SBIR and the Phase III Challenge of 
Commercialization. Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11392/ 
 21 
There is strong and compelling evidence that the United States is considerably more innovative as a 
result of the SBIR program than it would be without it.   
 Recipient SBIR firms are more innovative: Existing small businesses are more 
innovative as a result of the SBIR program. A painstaking study undertaken by the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences found that around two-thirds of the 
projects would not have been undertaken had they not received SBIR funding.15 The same 
study also identified a remarkably high rate of innovative activity emanating from the 
SBIR-funded projects. Slightly less than half of the SBIR-funded projects actually resulted 
in an innovation in the form of a new product or service that was introduced into the 
market. Such a high rate of innovative success is striking given the inherently early stage 
and high-risk nature of the funded projects (for a thorough review and summary of the 
empirical evidence testing the systematic impacts of the SBIR see Audretsch, 2010). 
 The SBIR has generated more technology-based startups:  The SBIR program results 
in a greater number of technology-based firms. One key study found that over one-fifth of 
all recipient SBIR companies would not have existed in the absence of an SBIR award. 
 Recipient SBIR firms have stronger growth performance: Studies consistently find 
that firms receiving SBIR awards exhibit higher growth rates than do control groups of 
matched pair companies. 
 Recipient SBIR firms are more likely to survive: The early phase for technology 
entrepreneurial ventures has been characterized as the valley of death.  The empirical 
evidence suggests that the likelihood of survival for young technology-based SBIR 
recipients is greater than for comparable companies in carefully selected control groups.  
 The SBIR has resulted in greater commercialization of university-based research: 
Empirical evidence points to a high involvement of universities in SBIR funded projects. One 
or more founders have been employed at a university in two-thirds of the SBIR recipient 
firms. More than one-quarter of the SBIR-funded projects involved contractors from 
university faculties. 
 The SBIR has increased the number of university entrepreneurs:  Studies find that 
scientists and engineers from universities have become entrepreneurs and started new 
companies, who otherwise might never have done so. Some of these university-based 
entrepreneurs are involved in firms that have received SBIR awards.  Others have been 
inspired to become entrepreneurs as a result of learning about the efficacy of becoming an 
entrepreneur from the observed success and experiences of their colleagues who have 
been involved with SBIR-funded companies. 
Despite the compelling evidence of the strong and significant impact that the SBIR program has 
contributed to promoting innovation in the United States, there are also a number of important 
qualifications and concerns about the impact of the SBIR.  An important study by Gans and Stern 
found that many of the projects receiving SBIR funding would have been undertaken even in the 
absence of SBIR support (Gans and Stern, 2003).  Their results cast at least some doubt that the 
SBIR generates innovative activity that otherwise would not have been undertaken.  Similarly, a 
study by Lerner concludes that while firms receiving support from the SBIR do exhibit higher rates 
of growth, having multiple awards does not contribute to higher firm growth rates (Lerner, 1996).  
In addition, Wallsten (2000) concludes that firms receiving SBIR support do not significantly 
increase their investments in R&D and innovative activity.  Other concerns have been expressed 
concerning the strong geographic concentration of the SBIR Awards and the relatively low 
participation rates of females and minorities in procuring SBIR Awards (Audretsch, 2010). 
                                                 
15  National Research Council, An Assessment of the SBIR Program. C. Wessner (ed.), Washington, D.C.: 
National Academies Press, 2008. 
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Some agencies, such as the Department of Defense and NASA select potential awardees on desired 
emerging potential technologies, while other agencies such as NIH and HHS select awards based on 
potential returns to society. SBIR and most public funds emphasize the importance of early-stage 
financing, which is generally ignored by private venture capital. Some of the most innovative 
American companies received early-stage financing from SBIR, including Apple Computer, Chiron, 
Compaq, and Intel.  
The design of the SBIR program is as follows:16 
Phase I 
Federal agencies solicit contract proposals or applications for feasibility-related research with either 
general or narrow requirements as determined by the needs of that agency. Proposals are 
competitively evaluated on scientific and technical merit and feasibility, potential for 
commercialization, program balance and agency requirements, and may require a Phase II proposal 
as a deliverable. Awarded efforts are further evaluated before consideration for Phase II funding. 
Agencies may select to fund multiple proposals for a given project or need.  
Phase II 
Phase II funding is awarded to selected Phase I-funded projects based on merit and commercial 
potential so that they can continue R/R&D efforts. Examples of commercial potential include a 
record of successful commercialization, private sector funding commitments, and Phase III follow-
on commitments. 
Phase III  
Projects resulting from or concluding prior SBIR-funded efforts but that are funded by sources 
outside of the SBIR program may receive a Phase III award for commercialization of the resulting 
products, productions, services, research, and research and development.  
Figure 5: The structure of the SBIR program 
 
Source: Adapted from Wessner, An Assessment of the SBIR Program, p.23 
 
                                                 
16  See: http://www.sbir.gov/faq/sbir#t25n66932 
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In 2009, the SBIR program was budgeted more than $2.5 billion. The SBIR consists of the following 
three phases: Phase I is oriented toward determining the scientific and technical merit along with 
the feasibility of a proposed research idea. The award is for 6 months and cannot exceed $150,000. 
Phase II extends the technological idea and emphasizes commercialization. A Phase II award is 
awarded to the most promising of the Phase I projects based on scientific and technical merit, the 
expected value to the funding agency, company capability and commercial potential. The award is 
for a maximum of 24 months and generally does not exceed $1,000,000. Phase I awards 
accounted for $47 million, Phase II, $194 million.17  
Table 3: SBIR awards, by award phase: FY 1983-2006 
 
 
 
SBIR 
Fiscal year Phase I Phase II Total 
1983 686 0 686 
1984 999 338 1,337 
1985 1,397 407 1,804 
1986 1,945 564 2,509 
1987 2,189 768 2,957 
1988 2,013 711 2,724 
1989 2,137 749 2,886 
1990 2,346 837 3,183 
1991 2,553 788 3,341 
1992 2,559 916 3,475 
1993 2,898 1,141 4,039 
1994 3,102 928 4,030 
1995 3,085 1,263 4,348 
1996 2,841 1,191 4,032 
1997 3,371 1,404 4,775 
1998 3,022 1,320 4,342 
1999 3,334 1,256 4,590 
2000 3,166 1,330 4,496 
2001 3,215 1,533 4,748 
2002 4,243 1,577 5,820 
2003 4,465 1,759 6,224 
2004 4,638 2,013 6,651 
2005 4,300 1,871 6,171 
2006 3,835 2,026 5,861 
Total 68,339 26,690 95,029 
Source: Adapted from National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010. 
  
                                                 
17  The US Department of Defense also uses the SBIR program to fund firms, awarding more than $10,253 
billion between 1983 and 2006. 
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As shown in Table 3, approximately 40% of Phase I awards continue on to Phase II. Phase III 
involves additional private funding in various forms for the commercial application of a technology. 
Taken together, public SME funding is about two thirds as large as private venture capital and the 
SBIR represents about 60% of all public small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) finance 
programs. In 1995, the sum of equity financing provided through and guaranteed by SME programs 
was $2.5 billion, which amounted to more than 60% of the total money disbursed by traditional 
venture funds that year. Through the SBIR program, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) awarded 
$266 million to small firms for medical and biopharmaceutical research. As shown in Table 4, over 
$20.8 billion was disseminated to eleven different agencies from 1983 to 2006. 
Table 4: SBIR award funding, by type of award and federal agency: FY 1983-2006 (in 
millions of current dollars) 
Year All Phase I 
Phase 
II DOD HHS NASA DOE NSF DHSa USDA DOT EPA ED DOC 
1983 44.5 44.5 0.0 20 7 5 5 5 NA 1 * * * 0 
1984 108.4 48.0 60.4 45 23 13 16 7 NA 2 2 1 1 0 
1985 199.1 69.1 130.0 78 45 29 26 10 NA 3 3 2 1 0 
1986 297.9 98.5 199.4 151 57 36 29 15 NA 4 4 3 2 1 
1987 350.5 109.6 240.9 194 67 32 28 17 NA 4 3 3 2 2 
1988 389.1 101.9 248.9 208 73 47 30 17 NA 4 3 3 2 1 
1989 431.9 107.7 321.7 233 79 52 33 19 NA 4 4 3 2 1 
1990 460.7 118.1 341.8 241 84 62 39 20 NA 4 4 3 2 1 
1991 483.1 127.9 335.9 241 93 69 39 22 NA 5 6 4 3 1 
1992 508.4 127.9 371.2 242 102 79 43 23 NA 6 3 4 2 2 
1993 698.0 154.0 490.7 385 126 86 50 29 NA 7 4 5 3 2 
1994 717.6 220.4 473.6 354 133 116 53 34 NA 7 7 5 3 4 
1995 834.5 232.2 601.9 414 181 118 70 42 NA 9 10 7 3 8 
1996 916.3 228.9 645.8 479 189 114 62 41 NA 9 7 5 3 6 
1997 1,106.9 277.6 789.1 569 252 121 75 54 NA 10 8 6 4 7 
1998 1,066.7 262.3 804.4 540 267 96 76 53 NA 13 6 5 5 7 
1999 1,096.5 299.5 797.0 514 314 89 81 60 NA 13 6 5 5 7 
2000 1,190.2 302.0 888.2 549 355 93 86 65 NA 15 6 8 6 7 
2001 1,294.3 317.0 977.3 576 412 106 87 72 NA 16 6 6 7 7 
2002 1,434.7 411.4 1,023.3 621 487 110 96 78 NA 17 6 6 8 7 
2003 1,670.3 455.3 1,215.0 804 531 109 94 90 NA 17 3 6 8 8 
2004 1,867.6 498.8 1,368.8 929 572 106 104 90 19 19 4 8 9 9 
2005 1,865.9 461.2 1,404.7 926 580 113 100 79 22 19 4 6 8 9 
2006 1,883.2 411.2 1,472.0 940 573 104 104 90 30 17 3 6 9 7 
Total 20916.3 5485.0 15202.0 10253.0 5602.0 1905.0 1426.0 1032.0 71.0 225.0 112.0 110.0 98.0 104.0 
Source: Adapted from National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010. 
 
NA = not available; * = ≤$500,000 
DHS = Department of Homeland Security; DOC = Department of Commerce; DOD = Department of Defense; DOE = 
Department of Energy; DOT = Department of Transportation; ED = Department of Education;  
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency; HHS = Department of Health and Human Services; NASA = National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration; NSF = National Science Foundation; SBIR = Small Business Innovation Research program; USDA 
= US Department of Agriculture 
a
DHS, established by Homeland Security Act of 2002 and formed in January 2003, held first SBIR competition in FY 2004.  
NOTES: Agency obligations based on information from Small Business Administration (SBA). Data do not necessarily 
contain subsequent-year revisions and may not add to total. 
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Selection process of winning project and criteria needed to select awardees 
The process for the selection of awardees is straightforward. From the time a solicitation is 
published on agency websites,18 applicants generally have two months to apply. Awardees are 
selected on the basis of merit, which is determined by a panel of experts. This panel is generally a 
mix of agency experts and experts from outside of the government, who come from both the for-
profit and nonprofit sectors. After submission, the respective agency generally takes six months to 
select awardees. The pre-conditions to apply for a Phase I funding are as follows: 
1) The awardee must be a for profit organization based in the US with no more than 500 
employees.  
2) At least 51% of the company must be US-based and for profit.  
3) For-profit firms may not have direct investment with other foreign countries. 
4) Generally, no more than three SBIR applications may be submitted at one time. 
5) The proposal must, as in the case of NASA: “clearly and concisely: (1) describe the proposed 
innovation relative to the state of the art; (2) address the scientific, technical and 
commercial merit and feasibility of the proposed innovation, and its relevance and 
significance to NASA's needs as described in section 9: and (3) provide a preliminary 
strategy that addresses key technical, market and business factors pertinent to the 
successful development, demonstration of the proposed innovation, and its transition into 
products and services for NASA mission programs and other potential customers.”19 
The purpose of these conditions is simply to ensure that the resources dedicated to the awardee 
will remain in the US and consequently benefit the US economy. Another aspect of the award is that 
most agencies attempt to select awardees where they feel a need for prospective innovations in 
their respective fields. Most agencies offer some sort of open evaluation checklist for applicants to 
consider, when they apply for an award. As shown in Table 5, one can clearly see how, in this case, 
the NIH weights its evaluations: 
  
                                                 
18  Coordination for all SBIR calls can be found on the US website https://www.fbo.gov/.  This website is very 
similar to its European counterpart:  ted.europa.eu/TED/main/HomePage.do  All calls can also be found on 
the respective agency home pages with clear instructions on what a particular agency is currently 
interested in funding and how to apply. 
19  http://sbir.gsfc.nasa.gov/SBIR/sbirselect2012/solicitation/chapter3.html 
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Table 5: Evaluation criteria for Phase I and II NIH awardees 
In considering the technical merit of each proposal, the following factors will be assessed: 
FACTORS FOR PHASE I PROPOSALS  
WEIGHT  
1. The soundness and technical merit of the proposed approach and identification of clear 
measurable goals (milestones) to be achieved during Phase I. (Preliminary data are not required for 
Phase I proposals.)  
40%  
2. The qualifications of the proposed PDs/PIs, supporting staff, and consultants. For proposals 
designating multiple PDs/PIs, is the leadership approach, including the designated roles and 
responsibilities, governance, and organizational structure, consistent with and justified by the aims of 
the project and the expertise of each of the PDs/PIs?  
 
20%  
3. The potential of the proposed research for technological innovation.  15%  
4. The potential of the proposed research for commercial application. The commercial potential of a 
proposal will be assessed using the following criteria:  
a. Whether the outcome of the proposed research activity will likely lead to a marketable product or 
process.  
b. The offeror’s discussion of the potential barriers to entry and the competitive market landscape.  
15%  
5. The adequacy and suitability of the facilities and research environment.  10%  
FACTORS FOR PHASE II PROPOSALS  WEIGHT  
1. The scientific/technical merit of the proposed research, including adequacy of the approach and 
methodology, and identification of clear, measurable goals to be achieved during Phase II.  
30%  
2. The potential of the proposed research for commercialization, as documented in the offeror’s 
Commercialization Plan and evidenced by (a) the offeror’s record of successfully commercializing its 
prior SBIR/STTR or other research projects, (b) commitments of additional investment during 
Phase II and Phase III from private sector or other non-SBIR funding sources, and (c) any other 
indicators of commercial potential for the proposed research.  
30%  
3. The qualifications of the proposed PDs/PIs, supporting staff and consultants. For proposals 
designating multiple PDs/PIs, is the leadership approach, including the designated roles and 
responsibilities, governance, and organizational structure, consistent with and justified by the aims of 
the project and the expertise of each of the PDs/PIs?  
25%  
4. The adequacy and suitability of the facilities and research environment.  15%  
  
Variation in the role of procurement between agencies 
While there is some variation in how and what agencies fund, the role of procurement is generally 
driven by the mission of the particular agency, as mandated by the United States Congress.  Some 
of the federal agencies, such as the National Science Foundation, have a greater focus on their 
mission of promoting basic research.  This fundamental mission to promote basic research is 
reflected in the type of awards and funding for the SBIR.  By contrast, other agencies, such as the 
Department of Defense and NASA have a greater priority on procurement that is consistent with 
their missions as mandated by the United States Congress, and less of a priority on basic research.  
An example of this type of procurement through the SBIR program is provided by NASA, which 
published a call for the following topics:  
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate Select Subtopics 
 E1.01 High Power Electric Propulsion Systems 
 E1.02 Nano/Micro Satellite Launch Vehicle Technology 
 E1.03 International Space Station Utilization Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate Select 
Subtopics 
 E2.01 Air Traffic Management Research and Development Science Mission Directorate Select 
Subtopics  
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 E3.01 Laser Transmitters and Receivers for Targeted Earth Science Measurements 
 E3.02 Advanced Technology Telescope for Balloon Mission 
 E3.03 Extreme Environments Technology20 
While the Department of Homeland and Security published a call, for example, for: 
 H-SB013.1-001 Radio Frequency (RF) Sensing of Personnel in Wooded Areas 
 H-SB013.1-002 Hybrid Analysis Mapping (HAM) 
 H-SB013.1-003 Burn-Saver Device 
 H-SB013.1-004 GPS Disruption Detection and Localization 
 H-SB013.1-005 Quick Disconnect Cables for Utility Power Distribution Systems21 
 
Most agencies offer similar types of procurement calls, where they determine areas where they 
would like to fund innovations.  
Yet, there are several agencies that differ in terms of procurement. The largest funder, the DoD, 
requires DoD liaisons between the SBIR office and the awardee. The liaisons’ explicit role is to 
introduce the potential technologies into their acquisition program. For example, if an awardee 
successfully attains a Phase III designation, it is the role of the liaisons to report the potential 
benefits of the innovation to the DoD acquisitions. Due to the enormous scale of acquisitions 
conducted by the DoD, the agency desires that these awardees do not get “lost” amongst the large 
crowd of acquisition applicants and be therefore flagged as having a Phase III award designation. 
The DoD, however, is not required to purchase from Phase III awardees.
22
 
Another agency which differs in its procurement methods is the NIH. Its solicitations are less 
determined by the procurement needs of the agency and are more consistent with pursuing the 
quality of the scientific contributions to basic research. 
The intellectual property generated from an SBIR award is often owned by the recipient firm.  An 
example of IP ownership remaining with SBIR awardees is given below:  
“NASA Select SBIR contracts will include FAR 52.227-11 Patent Rights - Ownership by the 
Contractor, which requires the SBIR/STTR contractors to do the following. Contractors must disclose 
all subject inventions to NASA within two (2) months of the inventor's report to the awardees. A 
subject invention is any invention or discovery which is or may be patentable, and is conceived or 
first actually reduced to practice in the performance of the contract. Once the contractor discloses a 
subject invention, the contractor has up to 2 years to notify the Government whether it elects to 
retain title to the subject invention. If the contractor elects to retain title, a patent application 
covering the subject invention must be filed within 1 year. If the contractor fails to do any of these 
within time specified periods, the Government has the right to obtain title. To the extent authorized 
by 35 USC 205, the Government will not make public any information disclosing such inventions, 
allowing the contractor the permissible time to file a patent.” 
Assessment 
With over 90,000 awards given and 20.8 billion dollars distributed, two bothersome questions have 
been raised about measuring the success of SBIR (Buss, 2001; see also Wallsten, 2001). The first 
involves selection bias: SBIR may award firms that already have the characteristics needed for a 
higher growth rate and likelihood of survival. The second suggests that SBIR recipients would have 
engaged in the same innovation projects and R&D investments in the absence of the SBIR funding 
                                                 
20  See: http://sbir.gsfc.nasa.gov/SBIR/sbirselect2012/solicitation/chapter5.html  
21  See: 
https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=08c964597fe81a759b165eb46ba30f78&tab=core&
_cview=0  
22  Unfortunately, no information could be found on how often DoD purchases products from Phase III funded 
SBIR awardees. 
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and was raised in an important study by Wallsten (2000), who finds empirical evidence that being a 
recipient of an SBIR award does not result in greater R&D spending or innovative activity.  
Although enhancing firm growth and survival is an important aspect of SBIR, it does not capture all 
of the program’s benefits. SBIR may benefit the economy by changing the behavior of knowledge 
workers. For example, Audretsch and Stephan (1996) found that scientists starting biotechnology 
firms deviated from an academic path or career with a large pharmaceutical corporation. How to 
induce knowledge workers—particularly scientists and engineers—to change their behavior and take 
advantage of commercialization opportunities is at the center of the policy debate in European 
countries such as Germany and France. Although it is important to analyze the impact of a 
government research and development program such as the SBIR on the ability of firms to survive 
and grow, such programs may have even more fundamental impact on whether scientists and 
engineers start the firms in the first place (Audretsch, 1995). Empirical evidence suggests that the 
SBIR has influenced the behavior of knowledge workers in at least two important ways. The first is 
that it may encourage entrepreneurship by some scientists and engineers who otherwise never 
would have tried to commercialize their knowledge. The second occurs when successful science-
based entrepreneurs who received SBIR support influence the behavior of their colleagues by 
inducing subsequent commercialization. Much literature exists on the importance of learning, but it 
typically focuses on firms’ learning. In contrast, this second aspect focuses on individual knowledge 
workers learning by observing the choices and outcomes of their colleagues. For example, Audretsch 
and Stephan (1996) attributed the clustering of scientists working with biotechnology firms in a 
particular location to the demonstration effect of seeing the success of their entrepreneurial 
colleagues. Thus, rather than focusing on the diffusion of particular processes, SBIR focuses on the 
diffusion of behavior (see Figure 6 in Audretsch & Feldman, 1996).  
SBIR may have another key impact by altering the type of science undertaken. Specifically, 
Audretsch and Weigand (2002) have looked at the commercialization impact of SBIR through 
altering the career trajectories. The authors find that in over half of their case studies (55% of the 
survey firms), SBIR induced individuals to start firms who otherwise would not. In one third of the 
case studies, SBIR induced other colleagues to start science-based firms through the demonstration 
effect. 
In addition, there are indications that the experience of scientists and engineers in 
commercialization via a small business has an externality by spilling over to influence the career 
trajectories of colleagues. One quarter of the scientists interviewed in the case studies named 
specific examples of colleagues who were either starting a new firm or becoming involved in a 
small firm to commercialize their knowledge. The evidence from the broader survey generally 
confirms the findings from the case studies. 
Both the policy makers and scholarship provide the following consistent evidence that: 
1. A significant number of the firms would not have been started without SBIR. 
2. A significant number of the scientists and engineers would not have become involved in 
the commercialization process in the absence of SBIR. 
3. A significant number of other firms were started because of the demonstration effect 
by the efforts of scientists to commercialize knowledge. 
4. A number of other scientists altered their careers to include commercialization efforts 
as a result of the demonstration effect by SBIR-funded commercialization. 
SBIR co-financing and crowding out 
The SBIR program does not require co-financing from awardees. The primary reason why there is no 
legal obligation for co-financing is due to the aforementioned Valley of Death issue for small 
innovative firms. US policy for funding potential innovative products has not addressed the issue of 
crowding out of potential private venture capitalists. To date, no scholarly research has addressed in 
a systematic fashion to what degree, if any, crowding out has occurred. Yet, at least on a theoretical 
level, one can assume that the SBIR program is simply a policy instrument designed to help 
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potential entrepreneurs bridge the Valley of Death when they are unable to attract or find 
appropriate private venture capital. Due to the higher transaction costs of dealing with government 
and the lack of Phase III funding, one can assume there would be a clear preference for potential 
innovators to select private investment rather than public investment, which implies that the risk of 
crowding-out funding from private sources is likely to be small.  
The role of Phase III 
Most of the agencies do not offer funding for Phase III awards. NASA and the Department of 
Defense may selectively offer small funding for Phase III awards, but the primary purpose of the 
award is simply to serve as a signal that the SBIR awardee has successfully completed Phase I and 
II and is therefore at the potential stage of production. This signal can play an important role in that 
the awardee works almost exclusively with one agency, such as NASA, and therefore has an 
understanding of the agency’s operating procedure and the institutional norms necessary to 
successfully complete a potential project.  
In fact, there are also institutional problems in federal procurement of Phase III products. Federal 
procurement rules are generally very rigid and cost intensive for selling products. Procurement 
regulations require many new firms to have higher compliance and overhead which therefore give 
incumbent firms a competitive cost advantage when acquiring federal contracts. Indeed, the eleven 
agencies that are authorized to acquire products may also have a bias against SBIR firms due to 
the aforementioned mandated 2.5% R&D budget allocation going to SBIR firms.23  
Many of the Phase II awardees have asked the question, what is Phase III good for? (Wessner 
2006). Yet, many feel that the recognition of being a Phase III awardee, having been independently 
selected by an agency, adds a degree of legitimacy to any potential procurement bid they elect to 
submit. However, most of the Phase III awardees believe that there is a missing element of large 
scale finance which they require in order to become profitable.  
A.3 The Advanced Technology Program (ATP) 
During the late 1980s, the United States faced increasing competition from highly innovative 
Japanese firms. Policy makers concluded that some sort of policy instrument was needed in 
response to the advancing Japanese technologies, such as the electronic or automotive industry, 
which were outcompeting the United States.  In response to this innovation gap between the United 
States and Japan and also to the recession in 1990, policy makers and Congress decided to enact 
legislation which would enable private firms to acquire funding to help them commercialize ideas 
with market potential. 
In 1991, special legislation created the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) which was designed to 
help industry develop ideas into innovations and serve as a governmental conduit between the 
research laboratory and the commercial market. ATP’s express mission is to help manifest ideas 
into commercially applicable innovations. ATP was run by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), US Department of Commerce. As shown in Table 6, ATP supported 1,581 
different participants with over $4,614,000,000 of funding.  ATP belonged to the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, a subsection of the Department of Commerce, during its program life 
from 1991 to 2007.  Due to its $136 million budget in 2006, the George W. Bush administration 
terminated the program in 2007. The ATP program was succeeded by a new Technology Innovation 
Program (TIP) established by the 2007 America COMPETES Act (Public Law 110–69), signed 9 
August 2007. 
During its seventeen-year life, the program's uniqueness attracted considerable attention from both 
policy makers and scholars. It was seen as one of the first attempts by policy makers to deliver a 
                                                 
23  Procurement officers may view this mandate as a loss of resources on the particular agency, and 
therefore would be less willing to buy the final product that their agency has been mandated to fund. 
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governmental organization which could help firms in a knowledge economy context, after an 
industrial era that latest from World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
Table 6: Advanced Technology Program projects, number of participants, and funding:  
FY 1990-2007 
            Project funding (current $millions) 
        
ATP 
 
Industry 
Fiscal 
year Projects 
 
SA 
 
JV Participants   Total   All To JV To SA   All From JV From SA 
1990 11 6 5 35   98   46 38 8   52 45 7 
1991 28 18 10 83 
 
202 
 
93 65 28 
 
109 83 26 
1992 21 18 3 32 
 
97 
 
48 19 29 
 
49 19 30 
1993 29 24 5 50 
 
118 
 
60 19 41 
 
58 20 38 
1994 88 50 38 211 
 
640 
 
309 216 93 
 
331 233 98 
1995 103 62 41 318 
 
827 
 
414 304 110 
 
413 340 73 
1996 8 6 2 12 
 
37 
 
19 9 10 
 
18 10 8 
1997 64 49 15 101 
 
304 
 
162 75 87 
 
142 81 61 
1998 79 52 27 168 
 
460 
 
235 143 92 
 
225 157 68 
1999 37 26 11 57 
 
212 
 
110 61 49 
 
102 64 38 
2000 54 39 15 95 
 
274 
 
144 70 74 
 
130 74 56 
2001 59 46 13 88 
 
286 
 
164 79 85 
 
122 81 41 
2002 61 51 10 79 
 
289 
 
156 59 97 
 
133 61 72 
2003 67 55 12 104 
 
257 
 
154 49 105 
 
103 51 52 
2004 59 48 11 78 
 
270 
 
155 62 93 
 
115 66 49 
2005 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
2007 56 47 9 70   243   139 47 92   104 50 54 
Source: Adapted from National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2010 
 
ATP = Advanced Technology Program; JV = joint ventures; SA = single applicants  
 
NOTES: For multiyear projects, total funding attributed to year award made. Participants include SAs, JV leaders, and JV 
members and exclude subcontractors and informal collaborators. Beginning in 2000, funding and number of awards 
based on year recipient received funding, not on competition year. 
 
From a policy prospective, the ATP not only served as a bridge but also tried to identify the positive 
externalities of innovation. For example, a United States-based firm may be unwilling to invest its 
resources in a potential idea due to its perceived lack of return, but the potential innovation would 
have positive benefits to the economy as a whole if commercialized. While this innovation may 
have produced highly positive benefits to the economy as a whole, its benefit to the particular firm 
would be unrealized and therefore remain dormant. ATP’s mission therefore was to view R&D 
projects from a macro rather than a micro perspective, i.e. can this idea benefit the nation, not just 
the company? ATP's design was to share relatively high development risks of technologies that 
potentially had a broad range of new commercial opportunities. The ATP mission differed from 
other government R&D programs in that: 
 “ATP projects focused on the technology needs of American industry, not those of 
government. Research priorities for the ATP are set by industry, based on their 
understanding of the marketplace and research opportunities. For-profit companies 
conceive, propose, co-fund, and execute ATP projects and programs in partnerships with 
academia, independent research organizations and federal labs.  
 The ATP had strict cost-sharing rules. Joint Ventures (two or more companies working 
together) had to pay at least half of the project costs. Large, Fortune-500 companies 
participating as a single firm had to pay at least 60% of total project costs. Small and 
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medium-sized companies working on single firm ATP projects had to pay a minimum of all 
indirect costs associated with the project.  
 The ATP did not fund product development. Private industry bears the costs of product 
development, production, marketing, sales and distribution.  
 The ATP awards were made strictly on the basis of rigorous peer-reviewed competitions. 
Selection was based on the innovation, the technical risk, potential economic benefits to the 
nation and the strength of the commercialization plan of the project.  
 The ATP's support did not become a perpetual subsidy or entitlement - each project had 
goals, specific funding allocations, and completion dates established at the outset. Projects 
were monitored and could be terminated for cause before completion.”24 
ATP design 
The ATP partnered with companies of all sizes, universities and non-profits, encouraging them to 
take on greater technical challenges with potentially large benefits that extended well beyond the 
innovators—challenges they could not or would not face alone. For smaller, start-up firms, early 
support from the ATP could spell the difference between success and failure. More than half of the 
ATP awards went to individual small businesses or to joint ventures led by a small business. Large 
firms worked with the ATP, especially in joint ventures, to develop critical, high-risk technologies 
that would have been difficult for any one company to justify because, for example, the benefits 
were spread across the industry as a whole. 
Universities and non-profit independent research organizations played a significant role as 
participants in ATP projects. Out of 768 projects selected by the ATP from its inception, well over 
half of the projects included one or more universities as either subcontractors or joint-venture 
members. All told, more than 170 individual universities and over 30 national laboratories 
participated in ATP projects.  
ATP awards were selected through open, peer-reviewed competitions. All industries and all fields of 
science and technology were eligible. Proposals were evaluated by one of several technology-
specific boards that were staffed with experts in fields such as biotechnology, photonics, chemistry, 
manufacturing, information technology, or materials. All proposals could be sure of an appropriate, 
technically competent review even if they involved a broad, multi-disciplinary mix of technologies. 
As shown in Figure 6, the schematic overview of the ATP selection process clearly illustrates the 
degree to which proposals were properly screened and identified for potential positive externalities 
to the economy.  
                                                 
24
  Adapted from:  http://www.atp.nist.gov/atp/overview.htm  
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Figure 6: Schematic overview of the ATP selection process 
 
Source: Adapted from Wessner: The Advanced Technology Program: Assessing Outcomes (2001) pg. 186 
 
Assessment of ATP 
A rich and compelling literature has been generated which identifies and analyzes the impact of 
specific public policy programs and instruments, such as ATP, on the economic and technological 
performance and strategies of firms. A 2002 study by Branscomb and Auerswald, for 
example, found that ATP awards help bridge a funding gap left by venture capitalists, what the 
authors refer to as the valley of death. A 2000 study by Feldman and Kelley finds that ATP 
fosters knowledge spillovers leading ATP-funded projects to produce not only firm-specific 
benefits but broad national economic benefits as well. The same study shows that, in the 
absence of ATP support, firms are not likely to proceed with any aspect of their proposed 
project on their own. Studies evaluating the impact of ATP have also shown that an ATP 
award creates a halo effect, also known as reputation effect, for participating firms by 
increasing their chances of attracting additional funding from other sources (Feldman & 
Kelley, 2000 & 2001; Powell & Lellock, 2000). Other studies have assessed the impact of federal 
programs like ATP, DARPA and SBIR in terms of their effect on firm growth and productivity, 
employment size, number of patents secured, R&D cycle time and other related metrics (Advanced 
Technology Program Economic Assessment Office, 2004; Silber & Associates, 1996). 
This literature has been guided by the most prevalent theory of firm innovation in economics – the 
model of the knowledge production function. This was formally introduced by Zvi Griliches (1979) 
and links innovative outputs to knowledge inputs. Just as this theory takes the firms as given, or 
exogenous, and then analyzes their innovative and economic performance as a result of purposeful 
and targeted investments to create and commercialize new knowledge, the impact of public policy 
has generally been analyzed by examining the performance of existing firms. While the exact 
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nature and magnitude of public policy on firm performance varies somewhat depending upon the 
particular type of policy and study, the focus and therefore the return accruing from public policies 
such as ATP and SBIR have been largely restricted to improvement in the economic and 
technological performance of recipient firms.  
A.4 The DARPA Program  
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is an agency with a long history of 
advanced technology development for the United States Department of Defense. With the 
increasing threat of Soviet Union military hegemony in the late 1950s, the United States Congress 
and Military created a program to prevent technological surprises like Sputnik and to induce 
technological advancement for the Space Race in the 1960s. While its original mission was meant 
to develop space age technologies, DARPA increased the scope and scale of its mission from the 
1960s to the 2000s. Today, DARPA employs over 300 people and has an annual operating budget 
of $3.2 billion. Over the course of the past fifty years, the agency is widely regarded as having 
developed computer networking, hypertext, graphical user interface, stealth technology and drone 
networking.  
The agency’s current budget for 2012 is 3.4 billion dollars. Around 140 technical scientists work for 
the agency, which is headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. The agency is explicitly mandated to 
advance US military technology, and works closely with all areas of the US military service to 
coordinate and develop existing technological needs. DARPA is widely considered to have the 
highest R&D investment per scientist in the world. 
Today, the agency is considered to be one of the most advanced and secretive institutions in the US 
government. Indeed, this agency is often cited as similar to something from the Men in Black movie 
series, where a select few people develop future technologies unknown to the public or private 
market. For example, some of the projects selected, which are currently or were funded are; 
“Transformer” where the goal is to create a flying armored car, “Human Universal Load Carrier” 
where the goal is to create a battery-powered human exoskeleton, or “EATR” where the goal is to 
create a robotic solider.   
The structure of DARPA is best described as a group of small organized teams with short term 
goals. Given the enormous budget, one would expect some degree of hierarchy, yet there is little. 
The self-described motto of DARPA is “100 geniuses connected by a travel agent.” Their 
technological goals are set within a two to four year time frame and they are given almost 
complete autonomy to complete their projects as they see fit. The primary measure of success for 
these small groups is whether they have created radical technological innovations during their 
tenure, during which they had an almost unlimited budget.  
DARPA maintains six different program offices which are dedicated to choosing the best and 
brightest scientists and project bids every four to six years and overseeing and coordinating 140 
scientists in their respective fields. The DARPA director is routinely changed to ensure fresh and new 
ideas are introduced into the agency paradigm.  
While DARPA has advanced a plethora of US military technologies, it remains to be seen to what 
degree these advancements have crossed the knowledge filter and have actually entered the 
commercial market. Due to the top secret nature of these advancements, patents are not public for 
competing nations and the private market has no knowledge of how to endogenize these radical 
innovations.  
DARPA is designed to remain independent from the military’s more traditional R&D programs. The 
distinguishing factor between these two types of military program is that DARPA’s explicit mission is 
to fund and deliver radical innovations for the US military. There are, however, several problems in 
evaluating DARPA’s contribution to US innovation. Due to the secrecy surrounding military 
inventions, the returns on this significant investment remain relatively enigmatic. One should note 
the strong relationships to universities committed to basic research. MIT, the University of Alabama, 
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Carnegie Mellon University, Harvard University and the University of California system receive 
substantial funding for military research.  
Another interesting aspect of DARPA is that during the budget cuts in the mid-1970s, DARPA made 
significant cuts to its computer networking program. These cuts resulted in several key scientists to 
start up computer network companies and create private research labs such as the Xerox Palo Alto 
Research Center, Incorporated. Unlike SBIR and ATP, DARPA's structural design is much more like a 
lab of creativity and less like a typical bureaucratic organization. DARPA assigns funding to two to 
four-year projects where there is a high degree of potential radical innovations. These projects are 
overseen by highly educated DARPA staff who in conjunction with university scientists and industry 
research labs attempt to create advanced military applications. 
A.5 The Role of Other US Agencies in Innovation  
A.5.1 Technology Innovation Program (TIP) 
The Technology Innovation Program (TIP) was established by the 2007 America COMPETES Act, at 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), US Department of Commerce. Its mission 
is to assist US businesses and universities to support, promote, and accelerate innovation in the 
United States through high-risk, high-reward research. Its stated mission is to promote projects 
which:25  
• Have a novel purpose: addressing societal challenges not being addressed in areas of 
critical national need with benefits that extend significantly beyond proposers  
• Offer solutions to societal challenges: concentrating on those challenges that 
justify government attention  
• Have scientific and technical merit: supporting innovative high-risk, high-reward 
research  
• Promise transformational results: focusing on ideas with a strong potential to 
advance state-of-the-art and contribute to the US science and technology base  
• Involve rich teaming: funding small and medium-sized businesses, academia, 
national labs, nonprofit research institutions, and other organizations  
• Fulfill a clear government need: addressing problems that require government 
attention because the magnitude of the problem is large and no other sources of 
funding are reasonably available  
• Provide funding: Single Company projects up to $3M over a maximum of three years, 
Joint Venture projects up to $9M over a maximum of five years  
• Share Costs: requiring proposers to cover at least 50% of the costs. 
A.5.2 Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) 
The Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) is in many ways identical to the SBIR 
program. However, its core mission is to fund small companies which work in collaboration with 
universities. Another difference is that instead of the 2.5% reserved for SBIR funding by the eleven 
different agencies, STTR requires that five agencies26 reserve 0.3% of their budget for STTR 
funding. A total of $1.3 billion was awarded to over 6,000 projects from 1994 to 2006. Each 
awarded project required a university partner and was awarded Phase I and Phase II awards, 
according to the SBIR scheme.  
 
                                                 
25  See: http://www.nist.gov/tip/factsheets/upload/tip_at_a_glance_2011.pdf 
26  The Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, The Department of Energy, NASA and Health 
and Human Services 
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A.5.3 Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) 
The Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) is a national network of 60 centers across 
the United States. This agency, unlike other federal agencies, is run at state level. The purpose of 
these centers in all 50 states is to focus R&D efforts on technology acceleration, supplier 
development, sustainability and workforce improvement. Its explicit purpose is to help 
manufacturers develop and create new markets and products, thus giving a competitive advantage 
to US firms. 
A.6 Lessons that can be Learned from these Programs 
The previous sections of this report have established that there is empirical evidence that the main 
innovation programs in the United States – the SBIR, ATP and DARPA – have generally exerted a 
positive influence on innovative activity. While there is no reason to conclude that these programs in 
any way constitute an optimal policy to promote innovative activity, competitiveness and ultimately 
economic growth, the empirical evidence does suggest they have had a positive impact on the 
innovative performance of the United States. 
This section considers the adaptability of these programs to other countries from two perspectives. 
The first is whether the actual delivery and administration of the programs can be replicated. The 
second is whether similar capabilities and outcomes from the programs can be achieved. 
From the first perspective, the authors of this report believe that the answer to whether US 
innovation programs can be applied to other countries (i.e., duplicating the exact programs and 
administration) is negative. This is because of the central role played by US federal institutions in 
the design and administration of the US innovation programs. The SBIR, in particular, depends on 
the main federal agencies allocating a share of their research budgets to small innovative firms. 
Administered by federal agencies such as the US Department of Defense, the SBIR enjoys support 
from a mission-oriented approach to innovation. 
 Other countries have no agencies that are equivalent to, say, the US Department of Defense, either 
in terms of size or scope. Taken from the first perspective, this would seemingly preclude the 
applicability of the US innovation policy approach to other countries. 
However, it should be emphasized that the policy approach to the US innovation programs is a 
second-best approach. The SBIR, ATP and DARPA programs promote and facilitate entrepreneurial 
innovation indirectly in that the administering agencies do not have commercialization and 
innovation as their primary mandates. This approach was not adopted in the United States because 
it was considered to be the most effective way to promote innovation, competitiveness and growth, 
but rather as a second-best approach. It was not considered politically feasible to create new 
agencies and programs that directly promote innovation. Thus, the current approach in the US was 
adopted because it was considered to be politically feasible and not because it was considered to 
be the best way to foster innovative activity. 
Thus, it may be the second perspective that is the most relevant and important in considering the 
applicability of the US programs to other contexts. Here the focus is not on exactly duplicating the 
exact programs and administration, but rather on achieving similar capabilities and outcomes. The 
capabilities would be in terms of innovative capabilities of the local firms and the outcomes would 
be in terms of the innovative performance of the local firms. 
Rather than administer such innovation programs indirectly through existing ministries and agencies 
already mandated with a different mission, as is the case in the United States, other countries have 
the potential to establish agencies and ministries with a main mandate to promote innovation Such 
an approach would consist of three phases—feasibility, research and commercialization. Applicant 
firms and nascent entrepreneurs would make an application based on these three phases. The 
applications would be subjected to a competitive assessment.  
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The first phase would focus on the feasibility of the idea. The second phase would include those 
ideas developed in the first phase that are the most innovative and embody the greatest potential 
commercial impact. The funding in the second phase would be to develop the idea into a workable 
prototype. The third phase would involve actual commercialization. In this third phase, the firm 
would actually introduce the innovative product, conceptualized during the first phase and 
developed into a prototype in the second phase, onto the market.  
During the first two phases, the innovative activity would be funded entirely by the relevant 
innovation funding agency. However, the resulting intellectual property would remain with the 
company undertaking the innovative activity. This is a form of pre-commercial procurement that 
policy can deploy for innovative activity in priority areas. For example, specific social issues could be 
assigned a high priority by the relevant agency. In the third phase, funding could be shared by both 
the firm and the funding agency. 
This approach to innovative programs could fit the institutional context of other countries that do 
not have the equivalent of large US mission-oriented agencies. 
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Part B: THE ROLE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS (UNIVERSITIES AND REGIONS/STATES) 
This section illustrates the importance of local institutions in R&D and innovation. Given that over 
one third of total R&D is allocated to universities, it is imperative to understand what institutions 
are likely to facilitate growth. Moreover, are certain individuals more likely to be inclined to 
transform ideas into innovations for the local region? If so, how can local institutions, laws and 
incentives create more innovation in the knowledge economy context?  
B.1 The Relevance of Universities and Regions/States in Fostering the 
Knowledge Economy  
Why will scientists choose to combine their scientific creativity with entrepreneurial creativity? There 
are a number of theories and hypotheses as to why some scientists choose to commercialize 
research while others do not, and some compelling insights have been garnered through previous 
empirical studies. These include the scientist life-cycle which highlights the role of reputation, the 
knowledge production function which highlights the role of scientific human capital and resources, 
and the regional and university contexts which highlight the role of geographically bounded 
spillovers and institutional incentives. 
A large body of literature has emerged focusing on what has become known as the appropriability 
problem. The underlying issue revolves around how firms which invest in the creation of new 
knowledge can best appropriate the economic returns from that knowledge (Arrow, 1962). 
Audretsch (1995) proposed shifting the unit of observation away from exogenously assumed firms 
to individuals – agents with endowments of new economic knowledge. When the focus is shifted 
away from the firm to the individual as the relevant unit of analysis, the appropriability issue 
remains, but the question becomes; "How can scientists with a given endowment of new knowledge 
best appropriate the returns from that knowledge?" Levin and Stephan (1991) suggest that the 
answer is 'It depends – it depends on both the career trajectory as well as the stage of the life-cycle 
of the scientist'. 
The university or academic career trajectory encourages and rewards the production of new 
scientific knowledge. Thus, the goal of the scientist in the university context is to establish priority. 
This is done most efficiently through publication in scientific journals (Stephan and Audretsch, 
2000). By contrast, with a career trajectory in the private sector, scientists are rewarded for the 
production of new economic knowledge, or knowledge which has been commercialized in the 
market but not necessarily new scientific knowledge per se. In fact, scientists working in industry 
are often discouraged from sharing knowledge externally with the scientific community through 
publication. As a result of these different incentive structures, industrial and academic scientists 
develop distinct career trajectories. 
The appropriability question confronting academic scientists can be considered in the context of the 
model of scientist human capital over the life-cycle. Scientist life-cycle models suggest that early in 
their careers scientists invest heavily in human capital in order to build a scientific reputation (Levin 
and Stephan, 1991) that signals the value of their knowledge to the scientific community.  
With maturity, scientists seek ways to appropriate the economic value of the new knowledge. Thus, 
academic scientists may seek to commercialize their scientific research within a life-cycle context. 
The life-cycle model of the scientist implies that, ceteris paribus, scientist reputation should play a 
role in the decision to commercialize. 
An implication of the knowledge production function formalized by Zvi Griliches (1979) is that those 
scientists with greater research and scientific prowess have the capacity to generate greater 
scientific output. But how does scientific capability translate into observable characteristics that can 
promote or impede commercialization efforts? Because the commercialization of scientific research 
is particularly risky and uncertain (Stephan and Audretsch, 2000), a strong scientific reputation, as 
evidenced through vigorous publication and formidable citations, provides a greatly valued signal of 
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scientific credibility and capability to any anticipated commercialized venture or project. This 
suggests a hypothesis which links measures of the quality of the scientist, or his/her scientific 
reputation as measured by citations and publications, to commercialization. 
Scientist location can influence the decision to commercialize for two reasons. First, as Jaffe 
(1989), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), and Glaeser, 
Kallal, Sheinkman and Shleifer (1992) show, knowledge tends to spill over within geographically 
bounded regions. This implies that scientists working in regions with a high level of investments in 
new knowledge can more easily access and generate new scientific ideas. This suggests that 
scientists working in knowledge clusters tend to be more productive than their counterparts who are 
geographically isolated. As Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992, p. 1126) have observed, 
“Intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and 
continents.” 
A second component of externalities involves not the technological knowledge, but rather behavioral 
knowledge. As Bercoviz and Feldman (2003) show in a study based on the scientists' 
commercialization activities at Johns Hopkins and Duke University, the likelihood of a scientist 
engaging in commercialization activity, which is measured as disclosing an invention, is influenced 
by the commercialization behavior of the doctoral supervisor in the institution where the scientist 
was trained. The commercialization behavior and attitudes exhibited by the chair and peers at the 
relevant department also have an effect.  
Thus, the locational and institutional contexts can influence the propensity of scientists to engage in 
commercialization activities by providing access to spatially bounded knowledge spillovers and by 
shaping the institutional setting and behavioral norms and attitudes towards commercialization. 
Globalization has triggered a shift in the comparative advantage of leading developed countries 
away from the factor of capital and towards knowledge. For the factor of knowledge to be effective 
in generating employment, economic growth and international competitiveness, it must spill over to 
become commercialized. As Acs et al. (2005) and Audretsch et al. (2006) emphasize, such 
knowledge spillovers are not automatic and cannot be assumed to exist. Thus, in terms of Richard 
Florida’s insights about creativity, investments in scientific creativity need to be combined with 
commercial creativity to facilitate knowledge spillovers that can ultimately contribute to economic 
growth. Such scientific creativity can be combined with commercial creativity by scientists who 
choose to commercialize their research. 
This report has identified why some scientists choose to combine scientific and commercial 
creativity while others do not. In particular, the human capital and reputation of the scientist play an 
important part, as does the context, in terms of location and particular type of institution where the 
scientist is employed.  The evidence suggests that scientists with the most knowledge have a higher 
propensity to commercialize their research. However, scientist commercialization is conditioned by 
the type of university and the region. 
B.2 Complementarities between Centrally vs. Locally-based Policies 
B.2.1 The role of universities and the Bayh-Dole Act in economic growth and innovation 
When the Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 1980, it was a direct response to the US international 
competitiveness crisis of the 1970s. The Bayh-Dole Act shifted intellectual property rights created 
through federally-funded research from the government to the university. As Senator Birch Bayh 
pointed out, “A wealth of scientific talent at American colleges and universities — talent responsible 
for the development of numerous innovative scientific breakthroughs each year — is going to waste 
as a result of bureaucratic red tape and illogical government regulations… What sense does it make 
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to spend billions of dollars each year on government-supported research and then prevent new 
developments from benefiting the American people because of dumb bureaucratic red tape?”27 
One important aspect of such technology infrastructure in the United States involves both the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and its application. The Bayh-Dole Act has not only provided the 
requisite infrastructure to enable entrepreneurial activity to emerge out of universities, but it has 
also enabled “other actors”, and in particular university scientists, to participate in the innovation 
process, when previously they might have been excluded. 
The Bayh-Dole Act paved the way for the widespread diffusion of the university technology transfer 
office (TTO), which has served as a mechanism or instrument to facilitate the commercialization of 
university scientific research and to harness the ensuing revenue streams for the university. In fact, 
examples of the TTO existed prior to 1980, but some three decades subsequent to the Act's 
passage, virtually every major US university now has a TTO. The main mission of the TTO is to 
collect the intellectual property disclosed by scientists to the university and to encourage 
commercialization where deemed feasible and appropriate. 
The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) collects and reports a number of 
measures reflecting the intellectual property and commercialization by its member universities. A 
voluminous and growing body of research has emerged which documents the impact of TTOs on 
the commercialization of university research. Most of these studies focus on various measures of 
output associated with university TTOs (Shane, 2001, Siegel and Phan, 2005 and Mowery et al., 
2004.) By most accounts, the impact of the TTO on facilitating the commercialization of university 
science research was so impressive that by the turn of the century, the Bayh-Dole Act was being 
celebrated as an unequivocal success: “Possibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted 
in America over the past half-century was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.”28 With amendments in 1984 
and augmentation in 1986, this Act unlocked all the inventions and discoveries that had been made 
in laboratories throughout the United States with the help of taxpayers’ money. More than anything, 
this single policy measure helped to reverse America's precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance. 
Before Bayh-Dole, the fruits of research supported by government agencies had gone strictly to the 
federal government. Nobody could exploit this research without tedious negotiations with the 
federal agency concerned. Worse, companies found it nearly impossible to acquire exclusive rights 
to a government-owned patent. And without that, few firms were willing to invest millions more of 
their own money to turn a basic research idea into a marketable product.”29 
In an even more enthusiastic assessment of the Bayh-Dole Act, The Economist (2002) gushed that 
“The Bayh-Dole Act turned out to be the Viagra for campus innovation. Universities that would 
previously have let their intellectual property lie fallow began filing for – and getting - patents at 
unprecedented rates. Coupled with other legal, economic and political developments that also 
spurred patenting and licensing, the results seems nothing less than a major boost to national 
economic growth.”30 
Despite the generally giddy assessments of Bayh-Dole, Mowery (2005, pp. 40–41) has argued for a 
more cautious and balanced perspective: “Although it seems clear that the criticism of high-
technology startups that was widespread during the period of pessimism over US competitiveness 
was overstated, the recent focus on patenting and licensing as the essential ingredient in 
university–industry collaboration and knowledge transfer may be no less exaggerated. The 
                                                 
27  Statement by Birch Bayh, 13 April 1980, on the approval of S. 414 (Bayh-Dole) by the US Senate on a 91-
4 vote, cited from AUTM (2004, p. 16), and introductory statement of Birch Bayh, 13 September 1978, 
cited from the Association of University Technology Managers Report (AUTM) (2004, p. 5). 
28  “Innovation's Golden Goose,” The Economist, 12 December 2002. 
29   “Innovation's Golden Goose,” The Economist, 12 December 2002. 
30  Cited in Mowery, 2005 D. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High-technology Entrepreneurship in US 
Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else? Colloquium on Entrepreneurship Education and Technology 
Transfer, University of Arizona (2005) (21–22 January). Mowery (2005, p. 64). 
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emphasis on the Bayh-Dole Act as a catalyst to these interactions also seems somewhat 
misplaced.” 
However, there are compelling reasons to suspect that not all of the intellectual property created 
through the university is commercialized through the TTO (Thursby and Thursby, 2005). In 
particular, a university's TTO may be overwhelmed with intellectual property disclosures, forcing it 
to select and focus on only a subset of the most promising projects. Shane (2004, p. 4) suggests 
that by resorting to what he refers to as the backdoor, scientist commercialization does not always 
proceed through the implicit front door of the technology transfer, “Shane (2004, p. 4) finds that, 
“Sometimes patents, copyrights and other legal mechanisms are used to protect the intellectual 
property that leads to spinoffs, while at other times the intellectual property that leads to a spinoff 
company formation takes the form of know how or trade secrets. Moreover, sometimes 
entrepreneurs create university spinoffs by licensing university inventions, while at other times the 
spinoffs are created without the intellectual property being formally licensed from the institution in 
which it was created. These distinctions are important for two reasons. First it is harder for 
researchers to measure the formation of spinoff companies created to exploit intellectual property 
that is not protected by legal mechanisms or that has not been disclosed by inventors to university 
administrators. As a result, this book probably underestimates the spin-off activity generated when 
exploiting inventions that are neither patented nor protected by copyrights. This book also 
underestimates the spin-off activity that occurs “through the back door”: that is, companies founded 
to exploit technologies that investors fail to disclose to university administrators.” 
There is little empirical evidence to support Shane's admonition that relying upon the data collected 
by the TTOs and aggregated by AUTM will obscure the extent to which scientists resort to backdoor 
commercialization. Field studies (Siegel et al., 2003a and Link et al., 2007) and research from a 
survey (Thursby and Thursby, 2002), along with two university case studies (Bercovitz and Feldman, 
2006), clearly highlight the vigorous propensity of some scientists to resort to informal and 
backdoor activities rather than front door activities through the TTO for commercializing their 
research. As shown in Figure 7, the American University innovation ecosystem has developed 
significantly over the past 30 year as to where part of a universities primary mission is knowledge 
diffusion and profit maximization of its intellectual property. 
 
Figure 7: The entrepreneurial university 
 
 
 41 
One empirical analysis of how the Bayh-Dole act was implemented in Europe and other countries 
through the abolishment of the “professor privilege” is conducted by Czanitski et al (2011). The 
paper finds that the abolishment of the “professor privilege” led to an acceleration of the decline in 
patent forward citations. Due to the structural change in Germany, professors no longer had to bear 
the cost of funding patent applications, and the cost was borne by the professor’s university 
institution. The authors find that the overall quality of forward citations declined after the 
introduction of the German Bayh-Dole act. To a large degree these findings are rather unsurprising 
for several reasons. For example, prior to the “professor privilege” one would expect only the most 
certain and potentially successful patents to be registered by the professor, since he/she would 
have to bear not only the cost of the patent application, but also be responsible for commercializing 
the potential innovation, i.e. only the most certain patents with a very high general quality would be 
issued. After the abolition of the “professor privilege”, the cost of a patent application was less for a 
university scientist, thereby increasing the number of patents filed. This therefore lowered the 
average general quality of total patents issued by university professors.  
It is important to understand, when dealing with the entrepreneurial university, that whatever sort 
of patent is created, there must be a proper institutional mechanisms for it to become an active 
innovation As Aldridge and Audretsch (2010 and 2011) demonstrate, US professors are starting 
companies in far greater numbers than previously recorded and they also tend to not register their 
“best” quality patents with their respective universities. 
B.2.2 Role of regions/states in fostering the knowledge economy and growth 
Recognition of the role that firm-specific knowledge investments could play in accessing and 
absorbing external knowledge, and therefore enhancing the innovative output of the firm, triggered 
an explosion of studies focusing on potential sources of knowledge that are external to the firm. 
Some studies examined the role of licensing, cooperative agreements and strategic partnerships, all 
of which involve a formal agreement and a market transaction for the sale of knowledge. Thus, 
these all represent mechanisms by which a firm can access knowledge produced by another firm 
(but this might require previous internal investments in knowledge that are a prerequisite for 
absorbing such external knowledge, see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). 
A different research trajectory focused on flows of knowledge across firms where no market 
transaction or formal agreement occurred, also known as knowledge spillovers. The distinction 
between knowledge spillovers and technology transfer is that, in the latter, a market transaction 
occurs, whereas in the case of spillovers, the benefits are accrued without an economic transaction. 
Studies identifying both the extent and the localization of knowledge spillovers were also based on 
the model of the knowledge production function. Jaffe (1989) modified the knowledge production 
function approach to a model specified for spatial and product dimensions: 
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Where I is innovative output, IRD is private corporate expenditures on R&D, UR is the research 
expenditures undertaken at universities, and GC measures the geographic coincidence of university 
and corporate research. The unit of observation for estimation was at the spatial level, s, a state, 
and industry level, i. Estimation of equation (1) essentially shifted the model of the knowledge 
production function from the unit of observation of a firm to that of a geographic unit. 
Compelling and consistent evidence provided first by Jaffe (1989), but later confirmed by Acs, 
Audretsch and Feldman (1992 and 1994), Feldman (1994), Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 
(1993), and Audretsch and Feldman (1996) suggested that, in fact, the presence of external 
knowledge sources in geographically bounded regions increased the innovative output of firms 
located in those regions. Thus, there was clear and compelling econometric evidence suggesting 
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that external investments in geographically bounded regions would yield an increased level of 
innovative output by the firms located in that region as a result of knowledge spillovers. 
The new findings from the studies on spatially-bounded knowledge spillovers supported the 
knowledge production model of firm innovation in two main ways. First, the firms were still 
assumed to be exogenous, and second, knowledge inputs were still found to be important 
determinants of innovative output. The main distinction lies in the unit of analysis. Because of 
knowledge spillovers, the link between knowledge inputs and firm innovative output was found to 
be more important for spatial units of observation than at the level of the firm. 
The geography of firms has important implications on the spatial distribution of the impact of 
public policies directed at stimulating innovative behavior. It is already well documented that not 
only university research, venture capital, scientists and engineers, high-technology firms and start-
ups tend to cluster in spatial agglomerations (Saxenien, 1994), but federal support of innovation, 
such as the ATP and SBIR (Figure 8), also tends to be spatially concentrated in exactly these areas 
(Wessner, 2002; Black, 2004). 
 
Figure 8: Average annual federal SBIR funding per $1million of gross domestic product: 
2006-08 
 
 
The spatial correlation of knowledge assets, high-technology programs and federal 
programs such as ATP and SBIR suggest that a “winner takes all” policy may be emerging across 
regions. Those regions that have already established a successful high technology cluster are able 
to generate knowledge spillovers, attract firms, scientists and engineers, as well as draw a high 
share of federal support for innovation to their regions. By contrast, regions that have been 
technologically disadvantaged or have not yet developed knowledge-based clusters tend to 
experience difficulties in procuring a high share of federal support for innovation (see Figure 
8 and Table 7). This raises the question about the relative contribution made by public 
policies at the federal level that have a local impact: Is there greater impact in existing 
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successful high technology agglomerations, where the technology firms are already 
established and knowledge spills over without being impeded by a filter; or would public 
policy at the federal level have a greater, or at least different, impact in regions that have not 
yet established viable high technology agglomerations? 
 
Table 7: Advanced Technology Program, ongoing/completed projects, project-level award 
amounts ($M), summed by State 
STATE NUMBER OF 
PROJECTS 
ATP AWARDS 
($M) 
INDUSTRY- 
SHARE ($M) 
TOTAL ($M) 
Alabama 1 $3.3 $3.5 $6.8 
Arizona 5 $16.6 $14 $30.6 
California 120 $360.7 $353.6 $714.3 
Colorado 8 $15 $8.5 $23.5 
Connecticut 19 $55.3 $55.5 $110.8 
Delaware 5 $9.4 $7.6 $17 
Florida 7 $28.7 $29.8 $58.5 
Georgia 6 $12.3 $7.2 $19.5 
Illinois 21 $71.3 $75.7 $147 
Indiana 2 $3.6 $3.2 $6.8 
Iowa 2 $2.6 $1.4 $4 
Louisiana 2 $3.8 $3.1 $6.9 
Maryland 16 $50 $45 $95 
Massachusetts 48 $96.2 $78.1 $174.3 
Michigan 41 $182.4 $192.2 $374.6 
Minnesota 17 $60.9 $70.3 $131.2 
Missouri 1 $2 $1.4 $3.4 
Nebraska 1 $2 $0.9 $2.9 
New 
Hampshire 
2 $4 $1 $5 
New Jersey 26 $88.1 $95.5 $183.6 
New Mexico 1 $2 $1.8 $3.8 
New York 29 $72.1 $73.7 $145.8 
North Carolina 7 $34.4 $33.1 $67.5 
Ohio 17 $70.6 $71.6 $142.2 
Oklahoma 2 $3.5 $3 $6.5 
Oregon 8 $18.9 $17.7 $36.6 
Pennsylvania 18 $57.1 $61.8 $118.9 
Rhode Island 3 $4.4 $2.6 $7 
South Carolina 3 $41.4 $48 $89.4 
Texas 18 $59.7 $53.1 $112.8 
Utah 8 $15.2 $12.9 $28.1 
Virginia 10 $31.1 $23.3 $54.4 
Washington 2 $3.9 $1.4 $5.3 
Wisconsin 5 $9 $6.1 $15.1 
 
State Count 
 
Project Count 
 
Total ATP ($M) 
 
Total Industry ($M) 
 
Grand Total ($M) 
34 481 $1,491.5 $1,457.6 $2,949.1 
Source: Adapted from Wessner, The Advanced Technology Program: Assessing Outcomes (2001) 
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PART C: LESSONS FROM THE US PROGRAMS 
This section offers several key policy implications which can be drawn from the U.S programs to fit 
the context of other countries. The primary problems of replicating a SBIR type institution are 
identified and addressed.  
There is little doubt that the US public innovation system has provided robust and significant 
contributions to the economic growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (Wessner 2010). To 
what degree can this contribution be replicated in other countries’ institutional mechanisms remains 
an open question, given that the US system is predicated on several consistent and important 
features. 
C.1  Does US public intervention have a positive impact? 
C.1.1  Crowding out / crowding in: halo effect 
Most research on the US system has focused on whether or not there is potential crowding out 
from private sector finance. There is no clear consensus on whether there is, indeed, a crowding out 
effect. However, research by Hall, David and Toole (1999) suggest that the effect is, at a minimum, 
negligible for private finance. They also note that there is potential opposite effect of “crowding in.” 
This effect, which is also termed the “halo effect”, is thought to be associated with private investors 
who see the potential awards as a signal of quality and consequently are willing to invest more 
time and effort in a potential awardee, rather than treat the awardee as an unknown quantity. 
There are qualitative differences in awards that need to be considered by potential investors. For 
example, receiving an SBIR I award may not add additional interest to the VC market. However, if an 
awardee receives an SBIR III award, this signals to the market that the firm has not only produced a 
potential product, but also that this product is something the US government may wish to purchase 
in an opening bidding contest. . 
SBIR III awards may serve to provide high quality information between investor and entrepreneur. 
Uncertainty for investors is one of the most negative factors in their decision as to whether to 
invest in a potential firm or not. If the investor believes the SBIR award system to be of high quality, 
this removes an important degree of uncertainty.  
C.1.2  Geographical diversification 
The second important aspect is that in other countries, venture capital markets are not as advanced 
or geographically disperse as in the US. Venture capital in other countries is generally centralized in 
the most concentrated hubs such as, in Europe, London, Paris or Munich. Other countries also tend 
to focus more on innovation from medium- and large firms than on innovation from small firms. 
The introduction of an SBIR system could help to lower the sunk costs for potential venture capital 
which would allow capital markets to diversify their portfolio into larger percentages of small firm 
ventures.  
As shown in Table 8, the US venture market for early stage start-ups rose from 2.6 billion dollars in 
1996 to 5.3 billion dollars twelve years later. Indeed, there is a wide diversity of venture capital for 
a broad range of industries. While there are central clusters of venture capital for specific 
technologies, such as biotech venture capital in Silicon Valley, there are also venture markets 
spanning the U.S. A lack of venture capital outside of the hubs remains an obstacle for economic 
innovation. 
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Table 8: US venture capital investment, financing stage, industry, and number of 
companies: 1995-2008 
        
(Millions of current dollars) 
Financing 
stage/industry/number of 
companies 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
All financing stages 7,628 10,840 14,364 20,172 52,016 101,767 39,308 21,250 19,278 22,117 22,922 26,334 30,639 28,077 
Seed/startup 1,244 1,267 1,309 1,679 3,571 3,053 739 327 341 461 893 1,194 1,330 1,494 
Early 1,694 2,614 3,430 5,389 11,263 24,569 8,387 3,723 3,455 3,918 3,830 4,195 5,686 5,346 
Expansion 3,553 5,340 7,382 9,999 28,720 58,138 22,248 12,063 9,760 9,086 8,574 11,417 11,386 10,473 
Later 1,138 1,619 2,243 3,105 8,463 16,007 7,935 5,138 5,723 8,653 9,626 9,528 12,237 10,765 
All industries 7,628 10,840 14,364 20,172 52,016 101,767 39,308 21,250 19,278 22,117 22,922 26,334 30,639 28,077 
Biotechnology 768 1,156 1,385 1,520 2,029 4,057 3,400 3,183 3,553 4,145 3,924 4,504 5,247 4,410 
Business products and 
services 
177 377 409 691 2,791 4,560 1,031 450 579 396 396 552 709 477 
Computers and 
peripherals 
324 383 377 372 897 1,596 655 457 373 590 539 532 586 424 
Consumer products and 
services 
473 503 738 622 2,534 3,350 662 228 163 309 304 407 476 437 
Electronics 
/Instrumentation 
125 193 260 227 282 773 381 314 236 351 438 722 563 574 
Financial services 194 329 362 781 2,202 4,180 1,380 338 410 520 918 462 558 526 
Healthcare services 448 664 869 926 1,368 1,352 499 368 222 363 407 381 295 192 
Industrial/energy 529 504 696 1,407 1,508 2,479 1,067 740 756 775 808 1,925 3,222 4,576 
Information technology 
services 
178 430 655 1,057 3,958 8,619 2,391 1,039 775 737 1,063 1,377 1,707 1,812 
Media and 
entertainment 
910 1,074 956 1,744 6,560 10,299 2,312 712 879 965 1,149 1,624 1,962 1,884 
Medical devices and 
equipment 
627 648 1,016 1,144 1,511 2,312 1,997 1,838 1,602 1,921 2,186 2,910 3,872 3,446 
Networking and 
equipment 
347 612 937 1,360 4,259 11,409 5,543 2,595 1,737 1,545 1,517 1,091 1,378 735 
Other 10 21 56 88 84 45 62 4 0 1 57 8 2 23 
Retailing/distribution 314 257 303 609 2,805 3,067 321 151 65 174 207 201 365 235 
Semiconductors 202 299 567 618 1,290 3,542 2,391 1,503 1,764 2,128 1,923 2,101 2,080 1,641 
Software 1,123 2,218 3,281 4,367 10,295 24,012 10,141 5,150 4,462 5,375 4,803 4,920 5,423 5,027 
Telecommunications 880 1,171 1,498 2,639 7,642 16,116 5,074 2,180 1,701 1,822 2,283 2,618 2,196 1,659 
Internet specific 505 1,562 2,359 4,457 23,331 42,233 9,848 3,577 2,388 2,875 3,336 4,336 5,176 4,871 
Clean technology 77 157 144 107 200 577 386 390 263 440 523 1,458 2,656 4,023 
Number of companies 1,539 2,076 2,537 2,979 4,404 6,335 3,786 2,634 2,461 2,625 2,708 3,089 3,301 3,262 
NOTES: Seed/startup includes proof of concept (seed), research, product development, or initial marketing. Early includes 
financing for activities such as initial expansion, commercial manufacturing, and marketing. Expansion includes major 
expansion of activities, or to prepare a company expecting to go public within 6–12 months. Later includes acquisition 
financing and management and leveraged buyout. Internet specific are companies whose business model is 
fundamentally dependent on the Internet, regardless of the company's primary industry category. Clean technology 
comprises companies that focus on alternative energy, pollution and recycling, power supplies and conservation.  
SOURCE: PricewaterhouseCoopers/National Venture Capital Association, MoneyTree™ Report (data provided by Thomson 
Reuters), https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/index.jsp, accessed 23 October 2009. 
Science and Engineering Indicators 2010 
  
 47 
C.2  Does US public intervention show characteristics that drive its positive 
impacts? 
C.2.1  Agreeing on innovation targets 
US R&D differs from other countries’ R&D in several ways. The first difference is simply investment. 
The US can target strategic R&D investment on a far greater scale. Specifically, the US can 
coordinate at federal, state and agency levels. For example, to place a “man on the Moon” within 
ten years, the US was able to concentrate its ability on a specific goal at all levels of government. 
This focus is concentrated from the executive office and allows the US to have an economy of scale 
effect when strategically targeting specific innovative goals. In other countries, similar 
concentration usually requires that multiple large agencies have to deal with a higher level of 
compliance costs, which also takes time, in order to form a consensus on a particular goal.  
The second area of difference is that the US places an explicit goal of R&D transfer into the 
commercial market. As shown in Table 9, US agencies not only have to allocate 2.5% of their 
funding to SBIR but they must also actively seek partners to transfer newly developed technology 
into the market. Indeed as one notes, all US agencies are active in commercializing their intellectual 
property for commercial application.  
In general, national agencies are not required by legislation, such as the Bayh-Dole act or SBIR in 
the US, to make the necessary and important knowledge transfers. This legislation proved vital for 
innovative success in the US and it would be equally in any other context.  
 
Table 9: Federal laboratory technology transfer activity indicators, by selected US 
agency: FY 2007 
Technology transfer activity indicator Total DOD HHS DOE NASA USDA DOC 
Invention disclosures and patenting 
Inventions disclosed 4,486 838 447 1,575 1,268 126 32 
Patent applications filed 1,824 597 261 693 105 114 7 
Patents issued 1,406 425 379 441 93 37 4 
Licensing 
All licenses, total active 10,347 460 1,418 5,842 1,883 339 217 
Invention licenses 3,935 460 915 1,354 461 339 217 
Other intellectual property licenses 6,405 0 460 4,488 1,422 0 0 
Collaborative relationships for R&D 
CRADAs, total active 7,327 2,971 285 697 1 230 2,778 
Traditional CRADAs 3,117 2,383 206 697 1 184 154 
Other collaborative R&D relationships 9,445 0 0 0 2,666 4,084 2,695 
 
CRADA = Cooperative Research and Development Agreement; DOC = Department of Commerce; DOD = Department of 
Defense; DOE = Department of Energy; HHS = Department of Health and Human Services; NASA = National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration; USDA = US Department of Agriculture 
NOTES: Other federal agencies not listed but included in total: Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, 
Department of Veterans Affairs, and Environmental Protection Agency. Department of Homeland Security expected to provide 
technology transfer statistics starting in FY 2008. Invention licenses refers to inventions that are/could be patented. Other 
intellectual property refers to intellectual property protected through mechanisms other than a patent, e.g., copyright. Total 
active CRADAs refers to agreements executed under CRADA authority (15 USC. 3710a). Traditional CRADAs are collaborative 
R&D partnerships between a federal laboratory and one or more nonfederal organizations. Federal agencies have varying 
authorities for other kinds of collaborative R&D relationships. 
SOURCE: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal Laboratory Technology Transfer, Fiscal Year 2007, 
Summary Report to the President and the Congress, January 2009, http://patapsco.nist.gov/ts/220/external/index.htm, 
accessed 6 May 2009. See appendix table 4-43. 
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C.2.2  Creating innovation clusters 
In addition to the agency spillover, the US also created technology and knowledge clusters which 
are now associated with some of the best innovative firms in the field. As shown in Table 10, for 
example, Oak Ridge National Laboratory is a world leader in nuclear energy and has led to a myriad 
of very successful spillover companies. 
These specialized knowledge centers also attract needed venture capitalists to help facilitate these 
transfers. As one notes in Table 10, in the US most of these federally funded hubs are based in 
either California or the Washington D.C. area. These consolidated hubs require federal clustering for 
venture capital markets to move into the area. 
C.2.3 Coordination of public intervention 
The US is considered a world leader in transferring new technology to the market. However, it would 
be wrong to associate this success with a formula which can be easily replicated by other countries 
or regions. The US government is a unique organization, in terms of scale and scope of its executive 
legislative powers. The US also has world leading private and public universities and the sheer 
ability to drain the best and brightest talent from the rest of the world. These factors represent 
considerable competitive advantages and must be considered when trying to replicate innovative 
mechanisms from the US. 
Other countries’ systems are far from being able to coordinate on a scale similar to the US. 
However, that should not deter them from adopting successful mechanisms from the US innovation 
model. There are several areas (e.g. crossing the Valley of Death) where, with proper coordination 
and efficient funding, other countries could produce innovation which otherwise might not exist.   
C.2.4  Cost-efficient management of programs for beneficiaries 
The importance to expedite and efficiently turnover potentially highly esoteric SBIR award 
applications without placing a burden on small firms is imperative for innovative success. Small 
firms operate on small budgets, usually with just enough cash flow to last from several months to a 
year. If potential awardees invest their limited resources in an SBIR program application, it is 
important that are not be burdened by unnecessary costs. 
C.2.5  University technology transfer mechanisms 
In Europe, for example, one of the greatest achievements in the past ten years was the 
improvement in the quality of its university research. Costly investment led to increased 
publications and quality of accepted research. Indeed, one may imagine future scholars reviewing 
the past ten years as a period of “European University Renaissance.” As shown in Tables 11 and 12 
below, the EU has now significantly surpassed the US in terms of journal articles published and is 
relatively close in terms of top quality journal citations. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, a key note for US innovation, however, is its ability to transform 
ideas into innovation, i.e. the knowledge filter. Yet, if one of the primary pistons of US growth are 
found in regions rich with university technology transfer mechanisms, such as Silicon Valley, Route 
128 and the Research Triangle, an open and important question for the EU remains how to adapt 
the European university renaissance of ideas and transform these significant investments into 
innovation. If other countries do not implement proper mechanisms such as the Small Business 
Technology Transfer (STTR), for example, they will be unable to exploit these new and important 
ideas and may continually lag behind its competitors with better mechanisms of knowledge 
transfer.  
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Table 10: R&D expenditures at federally-funded research and development centers: FY 
2007 
na = not applicable; DOD = Department of Defense; DOE = Department of Energy; FAA = Federal Aviation Administration; 
FFRDC = federally funded research and development center; IRS = Internal Revenue Service; NASA = National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration; NCI = National Cancer Institute; NIH = National Institutes of Health; NRC = Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission; NSF = National Science Foundation 
(Thousands of dollars)         
FFRDC All 
expenditures 
Federal Sponsoring agency Location 
All FFRDCs 13,820,767 13,396,861 Na na 
University-administered FFRDCs 5,855,193 5,654,952 Na na 
      Ames Laboratory 25,254 25,254 DOE Ames, IA 
     Argonne National Laboratory 489,684 445,096 DOE Argonne, IL 
      AUI National Radio Astronomy 
Observatory 
129,000 128,158 NSF Green Bank, WV 
      Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory 337,306 336,927 DOE Batavia, IL 
     Jet Propulsion Laboratory 1,717,203 1,717,203 NASA Pasadena, CA 
      Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 503,775 443,273 DOE Berkeley, CA 
      Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 1,353,980 1,298,044 DOE Livermore, CA 
      Massachusetts Institute of Technology        
      Lincoln Laboratory 
618,011 613,858 
DOD, Department of 
the Air Force 
Lexington, MA 
      National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center 13,591 13,375 NSF Arecibo, PR 
      National Center for Atmospheric Research 144,293 132,375 NSF Boulder, CO 
      National Optical Astronomy Observatory 53,608 46,624 NSF Tucson, AZ 
      Plasma Physics Laboratory 75,720 75,488 DOE Princeton, NJ 
      Software Engineering Institute 80,566 67,657 
DOD, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense 
Pittsburgh, PA 
      Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 231,960 231,960 DOE Stanford, CA 
      Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator       
      Facility 
81,242 79,660 DOE Newport News, VA 
Industry-administered FFRDCs 4,780,586 4,693,399 Na na 
        Idaho National Laboratory 248,322 235,506 DOE Idaho Falls, ID 
        Los Alamos National Laboratory  2,046,260 2,029,056 DOE Los Alamos, NM 
        NCI Frederick Cancer R&D Center 
339,800 339,800 NIH Frederick, MD 
        Sandia National Laboratory 2,031,309 1,974,142 DOE Albuquerque, NM 
        Savannah River Technology Center 114,895 114,895 DOE Aiken, SC 
Nonprofit-administered FFRDCs 3,184,988 3,048,510 Na na 
        Aerospace Corporation 36,490 16,930 
DOD, Department of 
the Air Force 
El Segundo, CA 
        Arroyo Center 25,195 25,195 
DOD, Department of 
the Army 
Santa Monica, CA 
        Brookhaven National Laboratory 510,212 491,138 DOE Upton, NY 
        C3I FFRDC 46,368 46,368 
DOD, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense 
Bedford, 
MA/McLean, VA 
        Center for Advanced Aviation System 
Development 
7,290 7,290 FAA McLean, VA 
        Center for Naval Analyses 99,993 89,721 
DOD, Department of 
the Navy 
Alexandria, VA 
        Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory   
        Analyses 
17,007 16,519 NRC San Antonio, TX 
        Homeland Security Institute 25,370 25,370 
Department of 
Homeland Security 
Arlington, VA 
        Institute for Defense Analyses 
Communications and Computing 
59,500 59,500 
National Security 
Agency 
Alexandria, VA 
        Institute for Defense Analyses Studies and    
        Analyses 
141,500 141,500 
DOD, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense 
Alexandria, VA 
        Internal Revenue Service FFRDC 7,101 7,101 IRS McLean, VA 
        National Defense Research Institute 38,152 38,152 
DOD, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense 
Santa Monica, CA 
        National Renewable Energy Research 
Laboratory 
190,874 183,812 DOE Golden, CO 
        Oak Ridge National Laboratory 1,083,509 1,031,919 DOE Oak Ridge, TN 
        Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 851,512 823,080 DOE Richland, WA 
        Project Air Force 39,315 39,315 
DOD, Department of 
the Air Force 
Santa Monica, CA 
        Science and Technology Policy Institute 5,600 5,600 NSF Washington, DC 
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Table 11: S&E journal articles produced by selected regions/countries: 1988-2008 
 
Table 12: Share of region’s/country’s papers among world’s most cited S&E articles: 
2007 
(Percent in category) 
 
 
Citation category United States EU Asia-10 
Top 1% 1.64 0.82 0.41 
2%-5% 6.03 3.87 2.36 
6%-10% 6.20 4.64 3.22 
11%-25% 14.95 13.04 10.04 
 
 
 
 
(Thousands) 
 
     
Year United States EU Asia-10 Japan China Asia-8 Rest of World 
1988 169.97 146.37 50.74 33.86 4.63 12.26 92.29 
1989 177.72 153.95 55.85 36.98 5.48 13.39 97.09 
1990 181.25 157.92 58.27 38.35 6.10 13.82 99.23 
1991 187.12 162.69 61.80 40.66 6.23 14.91 99.11 
1992 187.52 171.22 65.48 42.54 6.75 16.19 97.65 
1993 190.54 180.66 69.80 44.39 7.60 17.82 96.01 
1994 192.93 190.29 74.54 47.07 8.05 19.42 99.11 
1995 193.34 195.90 76.18 47.07 9.06 20.05 99.23 
1996 193.16 203.95 83.29 50.35 10.53 22.41 101.37 
1997 189.75 208.90 87.48 51.46 12.17 23.85 102.36 
1998 190.43 214.76 93.80 53.84 13.78 26.18 103.44 
1999 188.00 217.19 99.56 55.27 15.72 28.57 105.46 
2000 192.74 222.69 106.47 57.10 18.48 30.89 108.55 
2001 190.59 220.41 110.90 56.08 21.13 33.68 107.46 
2002 190.50 221.72 115.46 56.35 23.27 35.84 110.71 
2003 196.43 224.85 125.56 57.23 28.77 39.57 114.88 
2004 202.08 230.48 135.58 56.54 34.85 44.20 120.50 
2005 205.52 235.09 144.84 55.50 41.60 47.73 124.73 
2006 209.24 242.79 157.58 54.46 49.58 53.55 130.66 
2007 209.70 245.85 165.83 52.90 56.81 56.12 136.77 
2008 198.84 232.94 165.68 47.80 60.98 56.90 130.54 
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